Aleksander Kiklewicz (*Olsztyn*)

The stratificational classificaction of speech acts

Аутор разматра проблем класификације говорних чинова на основу прагматичке функције. Ту узима у обзир и релевантне елементе контекста, на примеру контроле директног обавештења адресату или трећим лицима. Класификација говорних чинова коју предлаже аутор је дихотомне и хијерархијске природе.

1. THE CLASSIFICATION OF SPEECH ACTS: STATE OF RESEARCH

The introduction in 1962 of the notion of a speech act by J. Austin caused the necessity of classifying utterances due to their communicative function (in a different terminology – a pragmatic one), see publications: Austin 1973; 1993; Bach/Harnish 1979; Ballmer 1979; Ballmer/Brennenstuhl 1981; Beck 1980; Brinker 1985; Burkhardt 1986; Fraser 1975; Habermas 1971; Hindelang 1983; Holly 2001; Hundsnurscher 1976; König 1997; Kußmaul 1980; Nęcki 2000; Prokop 1995; Searle 1976; Ulkan 1992; Verschueren 1987; 1999; Weigand 1989; Wunderlich 1978 and others (although there also exists a stand on the part of researchers, according to which

the classification of speech acts is challenged, see Sperber/Wilson 1986). Thus, a number of classifications have come into being:

1. taking into account the illocutionary content of utterances, e.g. the speaker's communicative intention in the form of utterances;
2. taking into account the level of exposure in the formal structure of utterances the speaker's manifestations of intention; among others a differentiation of simple and direct acts of speech has been made, see Searle 1975; Clark/Carlson 1982; Awdiejew 2004, 58 and others; Dementjev 2006, 275 and others;
3. taking into account the way of influencing one's partner – among others

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persuasive and suggestive patterns of behaviour have been distinguished (Kiklewicz 2005b; 2007b).

Although many researchers belonging to the circle of pragmalinguistics have taken up a fundamental task consisting in the signing off particular types of linguistic activities (realized in the form of an utterance or a text), still the majority of them do not pose fundamentally new propositions, only certain variations, in which the of system speech acts, proposed by the founder of pragmalinguistics – Austin, is developed solely quantatively, in terms of the number of categories distinguished.

In literature the most frequently cited are two classifications of speech acts – on the part of the founders of pragmalinguistics: J. Austin (1973) and J. Searle (1976). These and similar classifications, as indicated by the German researcher W. Holly (2001, 20), are a priori (top-down) in character, that is why it has been frequently stated that there exist types of linguistic activities which have not received their qualification in any of the classifications of speech acts put forward by researchers. For instance, it pertains to expressing intensional states of the speaker, such as belief, conviction, doubt, knowledge etc., which are impossible to be treated as statements containing information of facts, that is of states of affairs in the physical reality. They cannot be qualified as declarative speech acts either (as seen by from Searle's perspective).

Lack of precision, incompleteness, inconsistency with the principles of scientific classification also pose features of applied classifications, taking into account practical aims of a mastery of language. Such a character, for instance, has a set of speech acts accepted in the European system of linguistic educa-

tion (Ek/Trim 1991,24 and others; Coste/North/Sheils and others 2003, 112).

Speech acts are described in a more systematized way by W. Holly. The communicative classification of utterances proposed by him is a two-level one in character: at first, types of communicative activities are distinguished:

1. solo ones;
2. interactions;
    2.1. non-symbolic ones;
    2.2. symbolic ones;
        2.2.1. non-linguistic ones;
        2.2.2. linguistic ones.

On the second level a classification of speech acts (linguistic activities) is carried out, which looks as follows in Holly's presentation:

1. non-intentional acts – uncontrolled activities ("Versehnshandeln");
2. intentional acts (controlled activities);
    2.1. forced acts, among others, ceremonial ones ("Zwangshand-lungen");
    2.2. non-forced acts, intended acts ("willentlich");
        2.2.1. deliberate acts – rational activities;
        2.2.2. non-deliberate acts, routine ones ("Routinehandeln").

At this point attention should be drawn to the non-intentional activities or non-intentional activities or intentional unaware ones distinguished by Holly (as well as other researchers) which, in actual fact, are contrary to Austin's programme principle: speech acts have an intentional character. Thus, the author *of the theory of communicative activities*, J. Habermas, even though stat-

ing that each linguistic activity is intentional, is not inclined to overrate the role of the intentional factor in linguistic communication (1997, 264). Habermas distinguishes several kinds of activity:

1. communicative activities – consist in the mutual coordination of behaviour plans on the part of partners through the interpretation and understanding of the content of linguistic expressions, in particular – through understanding their illocutionary power;

    1.1. communicative activities in their weak meaning are accompanied by the interpretation of facts reflecting the surrounding reality, and also by individual, idiosyncratic bases as well as the motivation of partners' verbal activity;

    1.2. communicative activities in their strong meaning are accompanied by the interpretation of normative (in particular institutionally relevant) bases of the choice of a particular plan of behaviour (and a particular illocution);

2. strategic activities – consist in the coordination of partners' behaviour plans through their mutual influence; verbal activity in similar situations displays not a communicative, but a sequential nature ("folgenorientiert"), not intentional, but perlocutionary, e.g. it takes into account the consequences of a linguistic interaction anticipated by the speaker, as well as conditioned by their context.

Apart from taking into consideration the non-communicative functioning of language (the representational function), Habermas distinguishes four types of linguistic use. (1997, 280) (Table 1).

In the Polish linguistic literature (see overview in: Komorowska 2003) the classifications of speech acts, put forward by A. Awdiejew and Z. Nęcki deserve a special attention. M. Marcjanik's (2002) classification of polite speech acts has a particular character, covering a particular sub-category of communicative functions of an utterance. The Awdiejew–Nęcki's proposal is interesting above all in that it has an *axiomatic character*:

Communicative units	Use of language
1. Monologue, representative (referential) utterances	Non-communicative
2. Normatively non-marked optative expressions ("Willensäußerungen")	communicative; understanding as a criterion of effectiveness ("verständigungsorientiert")
3. "Real" illocutionary acts (expressive, normative, constative)	Communicative; agreement/acceptance/approval as a criterion of effectiveness ("einverständigungsorientiert")
4. Perlocutive	Communicative; the consequences of a speech act as a criterion of effectiveness ("folgenorientiert")

Table 1. Types of language use according to J. Habermas

"The interpretation of a pragmatic utterance is based on four main criteria pertaining to a situation in which that particular utterance appears" (Nęcki 2000, 100). The above mentioned criteria are as follows:

1. the initial situation, e.g. the initiator of information exchange;
2. the consequences of completing or not completing an activity the utterance refers to;
3. the level of limiting the freedom of behaviour on the part of the speaker and receiver;
4. the interpersonal relation between the speaker and receiver (usually a relation of social status).

In this way the Cracovian researchers distinguish seven speech acts: proposal, advice, request, recommendation, promise, agreement as well as refusal.

As for the Awdiejew–Nęcki concept characteristic is its *functional approach*, consisting in the fact that the basis of the classification of speech acts is not the linguistic form of an utterance (the formal manifestations of the speaker's intention), but their communicative function, conditioned by the context of the situation in which an exchange of information between partners takes place:

We assume that in natural situations language users perform a "detachment" of a communicative act's meaning from its grammatical form, of the conventional meaning of a text and also the conventional non-verbal gestures. An accurate interpretation of the majority of utterances requires a familiarity with a situation within which that utterance was realized (ibid, 92).

However, it can be stated that the Awdiejew–Nęcki classification is incomplete: we will not find here, for instance, expositives introduced by Austin or expressives introduced by Searle. It is justified by the fact that a pragmatic act according to the above mentioned researchers signifies a *persuasive act*, e.g. "communicative behaviour whose aim is a direct influence on the interlocutors' behaviour" (ibid, 102).

Another problem consists in the fact that in the Awdiejew–Nęcki classification the levels of the categorization of speech acts are not distinguished. It is obvious that proposal, advice, request, demand pose a certain class of speech act (namely directive acts), which is in the opposition to advice as a commissive act as well in opposition to agreement and disagreement as acts of expressing stands.

Level	Category of speech act
Superordinate	Directive (directive acts)
Ordinate	Request, demand, proposal, advice etc.
Subordinate	Request for alms, request for a subsidy, request for silence, request for prolonging an employment contract, request for a prayer etc.

Table 2. Levels of the categorization of speech acts

In general, three levels of the categorization of speech acts could be proposed, which I will demonstrate on the example of directive acts (Table 2).

On each of these levels *prototypical effects take place*. It means that in a unit of superordinate, ordinate and subordinate categories more and less typical, precedential specimens can be singled out. Thus, on an ordinate level a request should probably be regarded as a typical (in the Polish communicative culture) directive act. On the subordinate level extremely varied realizations of speech acts occur. Compare one of the examples:

> Z anegdotek o Diogenesie z Synopy najbardziej lubię tę, jak stanął przed jakimś pomnikiem, jakąś figurą Matki Boskiej Ateńskiej i poprosił ją o jałmużnę. Przechodząca ludność pytała się Diogenes: „Co ty, głupku, robisz? Przecież to figura kamienna, a ty prosisz o jałmużnę". Na to Diogenes im odpowiedział: „ćwiczę rozczarowanie" (Jacek Podsiadło).

> [From among the anecdotes about the Diogenes of Sinope I especially like the one when he happened to stand in front of some monument, some figure of the Athenian Mother of God and asked her for alms. The public walking past questioned Diogenes: „What are you doing, fool? But it's a stone figure, isn't it, and you 're begging it for alms". To which Diogenes replied: "I'm practising disappointment".]

In the case of begging for alms the first criterion of distinguishing a speech act – request, is not fulfilled: in the Awdiejew–Nęcki interpretation the speaker, asking for a favour, assumes adequate possibilities (of performing an activity) and the will of the receiver (ibid, 102), whereas a request for alms is rather characterized by an anticipated lack of will on the part of the receiver – this feature in the Awdiejew–Nęcki classification is reserved for a demand. On the other hand, in case of a demand a very strong limitation of the receiver's freedom is anticipated and in case of a request for alms such a limitation is minimized.

In the work: Awdiejew 2004, the requirement for the multidimensional character, namely a two-dimensional description of speech acts was fulfilled. Admittedly, the author resigned here from the axiomatic approach, however he consistently distinguishes categories of two levels of abstraction: 1) interactive strategies (conversational) and 2) realized with the aid of interactive operators of acts. According to Awdiejew's definition, "A conversational strategy is a coherent chain of speech acts directed by the speaker and interpreted by the receiver, with the aid of which they aim at reaching a mutually accepted communicative goal" (2004, 69).

Depending on communicative aims conversational strategies are divided by Awdiejew into four types (see Application of the above categories in: Pałka 2008):

1. informational-verificational;
2. axiological-emotive;
3. behavioural;
4. meta-discursive.

Within strategies particular speech acts are realized.

It must be emphasized that strategies do not pose categories of generalization that are homogenous due to the pragmatic function of speech acts – between a strategy and a speech act there is a relation of a logical sub-

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ordination, instead a relation "entirety–part" takes place between them. The classification of speech acts is based on types of interactive operators. Awdiejew distinguishes operators (hence – it can be assumed – also speech acts):

1. *modal-syntagmatic* („which allow for a number of variants of verbal reaction" – Awdiejew 2004, 109): question, confirmation, acceptance, denial, negation, avoiding modal judgement;

2. *emotive-evaluative*: expressing approval, grumbling/complaining, feeling sorry for oneself, expressing anger/fury, resignation, jealousy, sympathy, gratitude, aversion, leniency, pitifulness, criticism, admiration, disgust, irritation/annoyance, envy, understanding, reproach, justification, congratulations, compliments;

3. *activities* (*behavioural*);
   3.1. acts urging to act: an act urging to take action, make suggestions, request, demand;
   3.2. acts of commitment: readiness, resignation, promise, threat;
   3.3. acts of determining a way of acting: advice, warning, permission/command, indecision;

4. *meta-linguistic* (based on meta persuasive operators);
   4.1. acts of blocking verification: blocking verifications of truthfulness or accuracy;
   4.2. acts of reinforcement: reinforcing an announcement through a change of hierarchy of an informative system; reinforcing

modal functions; reinforcing functions of activity.

The classification of interactive operators to a certain degree overlaps with the classification of a speech act, but it is not identical with it. Thus, operators of reinforcement probably are not always fundamental, separate speech acts, rather they cause an appearance in communication of something that can be termed as sub-acts of *speech*, e.g. categories of a higher level of specification (the idea of sub-acts of speech can be found in the work of the German researcher E. Weigand, see 1989, who, apart from her basic categories of speech acts, such as directives, representatives, exploratives as well as declaratives, *differentiates derivative speech acts*, for instance assertives as a subcategory within representatives).

Awdiejew writes about the application of operators of reinforcement of functions and activities. Compare:

> And how about going downtown/ going to town?

> What would you say to our going to the city centre?

> Do you mind our going to the town centre?

In this case there do not take place any specific metalinguistic speech acts, but a certain variant of act of proposal of which Awdiejew writes: "The decision of taking up a particular activity is shifted by the speaker onto the receiver, who while reacting, is obliged to take into account also the speaker's benefit" (2004, 149).

It is similar with operators (and acts) of indecision whose membership of categories of behavioural operators (and acts), at least

raises doubts. Instead, we deal here with a sub-act of a statement (suggesting a request) or with a hybrid act, combining in itself both information and request. As for linguistic expressions of the type:

I don't know what to do!
I have no idea what to do!

Awdiejew states: "The act of indecision is, in actual fact, a question seeking advice, directed to the receiver, although it does not always assume that the receiver is endowed with adequate competence so as to grant such a piece of advice" (ibid, 141).

2. THE STRATIFICATIONAL SYSTEM OF SPEECH ACTS

The proposed classification of speech acts has a few characteristic features: firstly, it is mainly based *on the pragmatic* function of an utterance (there are no kinds of manifestations – interactive operators) – in this way fulfilled is one of the requirements of the classification of speech acts, defined by D. Sperber/D. Wilson: "[…] The assignment of every utterance to a particular speech-act type is a part of what is communicated and plays a necessary role in comprehension" (1986, 244). Apart from the pragmatic function of an utterance during a classification of speech acts relevant elements of context are taken into account, for instance directing an announcement straightforwardly to the target addressee or to the third parties.

While agreeing with the opinion of the above mentioned American researchers that „many other speech acts […] can be successfully performed without being identified as such either by the speaker or by the hearer" (ibid, 245), I simultaneously sup-

port R. Kalisz's stand, who claims that the distinctive features of speech acts constitute an element of a real competence of language users (it can be termed as a pragmatic competence), who are able to differentiate, for instance a directive from a promise (1993, 50). The main task of each classification consists in reconstructing the really existing borders between categories, however the question to what degree the bases of such a categorization objectively reflect the existing mechanisms of transforming information in a linguistic activity and to what degree they are artificial – as constructs of sorts, introduced by researchers for heuristic purposes, depends on putting a research task, on applying its results.

Secondly, the above presented classification was generated in accordance with the *dichotomic principle*, e.g. on the basis of a system of opposition of speech acts. Recently the dichotomic presentation of categories of language and speech has been regarded as anachronistic, that is belonging to tradition, founded by structural linguistics. According to the supporters of "overt linguistics " examining linguistic units within a binary opposition limits the description to the so-called distinctive features, however the so–called integral features (for instance, the "cognitive meaning" of particular interest to ethnolinguists) are not taken into account at that whatsoever.

Defending the legitimacy of applying the dichotomic principle in descriptions of language and linguistic communication, I would especially like to emphasize its universal character pertaining to various subject fields. It refers not only to oppositions in phonology or grammar. For instance, D. McQuail while applying the system of binary oppositions presented a "model of a likelihood of reflection" in mass communica-

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tion (2008, 506). L. Kołakowski also wrote of the cognitive and cultural basis of the dichotomic presentation of various kinds of systems:

> Human thinking is habitually "structuralist" […] It means that we can only understand something owing to oppositional pairs whose quality is understood as an element; to put it differently, that we only understand by contrast, only when we can understand what is understood via absence; that an object manifests itself against the background of the world which it is not (1994, 71).

Thirdly – I especially highlight this aspect – the proposed classification of speech acts has a *stratificational* (or hierarchical) character: amidst the introduced categories of speech acts there takes place a relation of a logical subordination (also referred to as a relation of subordination/superiority, see Ziembiński 1987, 37). In the previous point discussed were three layers of the categorization of speech acts. In fact, the number of such levels is much higher because on the super- and sub-ordinate level there takes place a further specification of classes – its character probably cannot be determined in an entirely objective way as the number and content of particular subcategories depends on the theoretical attitudes (and not infrequently also practical ones) of a given researcher. In the subsequent points I will present particular categories of speech acts on the superordinate level, citing – as illustrations – examples of ordinate categories realized on each level (in this respect directive – appellative acts will be analyzed in the most detailed manner).

2.1. Inventional vs. conventional speech acts

The above mentioned opposition was paid attention to in my previous publication: Kiklewicz 2005a. The said opposition is based on the premise that people's communicative patterns of behavior simultaneously have an intentional, deliberate, perspective (it was precisely the last one that drew Austin's attention in the sixties of the 20th century, leading to the introduction of the notion of illocution), as well as the cause-effect, retrospective aspect. However, the latter is ignored in the majority of speech act theories.

Conventional speech acts partly fall into the category of expressives proposed by Searle, however in D. Wunderlich's (1978, 77) classification which comprises directive, commissive, erotetic (interrogative), representative, retractive (going back on one's promise, a correction of a statement), declarative and vocative (for instance, calling up somebody, engaging somebody in chit chat) speech acts, distinguished were satisfactive acts which have a reactive character – they take place after other states of affairs, in particular – after other linguistic activities.

In the German researcher A. Koefer's (1994, 49 and others) classification of speech acts the opposition of intentional and conventional oppositions of speech acts partly corresponds to voluntative (spontaneous) as well as normative speech acts.

Whereas the inventional speech acts come into being in order to fulfill a particular need of a subject, they constitute an element of its initiative, to a certain degree also an interference in the existing order of the day, conventional speech acts reflect a conformist stand of the subject, its subordination to the values and types of behaviour accepted in society. Inventional speech acts comprise forms of activity, they are initiated by the

speaker who deliberately acts in the form of linguistic announcements. In general, speech acts of this type can be presented as follows (see Kiklewicz 2007d, 102):

> 'X says S to Y; saying, X wants (X through speaking causes) an event R to take place with the participation of or with the presence of or through the agency of Y'.

Conventional in their essence, reactive speech acts result from the context of interaction and pose a kind of reaction of the speaker to the sates of affairs taking place. In reactive speech acts the speaker presents himself/herself not as the actively acting initiator of communicative interaction, realizing its interactive bias through the agency of language, but as the interlocutor who, perforce – through his/her involvement in conversation – is obliged to react to its course. The essence of conventional patterns of behaviour can be presented in the following explication:

> 'X says S to Y; event R – it is possible that with the participation of Y or in his presence – caused that X is speaking'.

Conventional speech acts are associated with a sphere of a phatic realization of language functions (Kiklewicz 2007d, 122 and others.). According to R. Jacobson's (1989b) definition "a channel of transmitting information is organized" via phatic communication.

Inventional activities have a practical character, usually conditioned by the necessity of individuals to co-operate with the environment. Conventional patterns of behaviour, to a certain degree ritualistic, rationed, quite the opposite, as claims J. S. Martemjanov

(2004, 204), do not serve goals to adapt to the environment, they have a culture-centric character.

2.2. Communicative vs. non-communicative speech acts

On the second level within the sphere of inventional speech acts I distinguish particular categories depending on whether a linguistic activity is directed outwardly, e.g. it has an extraverted character, communicative in its nature, taking into account the presence of another person (or persons), as it can, for instance be observed in case of a request, or whether it has an unaddressed, introverted character, according to J. Habermas (1997, 280) – non-communicative. Egocentric speech acts , for instance containing various kinds of expressions belong to this other type and are most frequently expressed via exclamations: *nay! oh! ah! oh! wow!* etc.

Incidentally, it is necessary to point out that the function of exclamations is not limited to the realization of egocentric speech acts. For, instance the Polish exclamation *oh!* can express impatience, discouragement, disrespect as well as surprise connected with recognition (according to the PWN multimedia dictionary).

Three kinds of non-communicative acts can be distinguished:

1. expressive (see above);
2. ethological (heuristic);
3. acquisitive.

The ethological function (ergonomic, applicative, see Kiklewicz 2008a, 20; 2008b, 35 and others) refers to the organization of discourse, above all the optimization of activities – communicative and non-communicative ones.

The acquisitional speech acts, especially characteristic of children's communicative patterns of behaviour consist in the fact that their aim is to shape a linguistic habit via a manifold repetition of expressions of a similar structure and a similar lexical content. Thus, B. J. Norman introduced the notion of a *pseudo-utterances which do not come into being in the* conditions of a communicative need, they usually do not refer to any referential situation and do not require any context (2005, 67). Often pseudo-utterances function with the aim of demonstrating or assimilating certain aspects of language, usually in the form of prototypical illustrations of the type:

> Po pięciu latach wojny nie umiem mówić. Potrafię tylko krzyczeć: nigdy więcej! – ale nauczcie mnie mówić. Chcę się posługiwać ludzkim językiem, określać pojęcia dobre i złe, powiedzieć „to jest niebo" i „to jest Zienia", mówić „tak" i „nie", a nawet po prostu stwierdzić, że „Ala idzie do lasu" (Kazimierz Brandys).

> [After five years of war I cannot speak. I can only shout: never again! – but teach me to speak. I want to be able to use the human language, to determine good and bad notions, to say "this is a sky" and "this is the Earth", to say "yes" and "no", and even to simply state that "Ala is going to a forest".]

As opposed to emotive declaratives which inform the addressee of states of emotion on the part of the speaker, egocentric expressives – as symptomatic signs – function on the strength of a natural connection between a person's emotion and the character of his/her patterns of behaviour, including linguistic ones. K. Polański wrote about this expressive function:

> It is connected with the fact that certain features of an utterance correspond to particular physiological and psychical features on the principle of a cause-effect relationship of the speaker and thus pose signals for the hearer concerning his/her physiological and psychical state (1999, 190).

In case of non-communicative expressives emotions are not so much expressed, but directly live through in the speech act which finds manifestation in various kinds of deviations from the principles of language, for instance grammatical relationships or word order, and also in special, emotively marked syntactical patterns.

2.3. *Polite speech acts vs. customary*

Despite the fact that both kinds conventional speech acts are to a greater or smaller degree automated (see Marcjanik 2002, 5), the former result from particular social pressures and assume the existence of informal sanctions (for instance: it is unthinkable not to greet one's acquaintance) – their justification is the fact that a deviation from rationed patterns of behaviour, as put by J. S. Martemjanov (2004: 187), violates the established order, in particular the predictability of social relations. Habitual speech acts are fundamentally optional, resulting from cultural knowledge and their usage is at times accompanied by an emotional effect, in particular ludic or party-like. In the former we deal with the realization of the so-called linguistic etiquette, e.g. with such speech acts as greeting, introducing oneself, making wishes, congratulations, expressing sympathy, offering food, thanking, apologizing,

bidding farewell etc. (see Marcjanik 2002; the Zgółeks 2004), and in the latter – with various kinds of paremiological expressions, often superstitious in character, see Kiklewicz 2007d: 116. Compare examples:

(A communicative partner complains about a difficult family situation, lack of money etc.): Dał Bóg dziecko, da i na dziecko [God gave you a child, he will also give you means for the child.]

(A communicative partner interprets facts in the light of his/her unfulfilled needs): Głodnemu chleb na myśli [The hungry man thinks of bread.]

(A communicative partner insists on having his/her way, in accordance with his/her knowledge and business): Mądry głupiemu ustępuje [The wise head gives in.]

2.4. Representative vs. causative speech acts

Representational speech acts contain statements; with their aid the addressee is informed of certain states of affairs – material or intentional (the range of this information is very wide, see further). A similar stand in the question of representatives is taken by the German researcher E. Weigand (1989: 116 and others). Utterances of this type are founded on deliberative verbs, such as *I say, I emphasize, I repeat, I answer, I speak, I announce, I inform, I express a conviction, I express doubt, I put a hypothesis* etc. The nominative part of a representational speech act can be interpreted as true or false – due to this property representatives differ from utterances of an impelling function. Compare:

I state that in literature the motif of evil is often present. – It is not true that in literature the motif of evil is often present or: That's not true! It is more right to state that in literature the motif of evil seldom occurs.

In case of causative acts realized is the impelling function, e.g. the communicative aim of the speaker is encouraging, inducing, obliging the hearer or oneself to carry out a particular activity. As R. Lipczuk (2009) states, causative acts, especially their prototypical categories – directives, have a decision-making power, thus can be applied in order to have authority or enforce law. In J. Habermas' theory (1971, 111) directives correspond to regulatives.

The difference between representational and causative acts consists in the fact that acts of the first type are more often realized with the omission of the performative manifestation. Quoting Austin, R. Kalisz states that the expression

Prices have been reduced

functions in the meaning: 'I'm telling you that prices have been reduced ' (1993, 31). It can also be put differently: the statement

I'm telling you that prices have been reduced

takes place in natural communicative conditions in the form without a performative verb.

Representative speech acts can be realized with the aid of means that are conventionally assigned to causative acts. The interpretation of the pragmatic function of an utterance is decided about not only by a lecture in the form of an interactive operator,

but also context, for instance the genre of a text. Interesting can prove the example of a scientific article of the Polish philosopher K. Toeplitz, which (it is a several-page-long text!) in its entirety consists of interrogative sentences. Compare the beginning:

> Isn't it so that the aim of each literary piece is an attempt at answering the question: "Who is man ?" And isn't it so – as my Master, Leszek Kołakowski put it – that when looking into a well filled with water, above all I see my own reflection? And doesn't this metaphor determine the answer to the question what the aim of literary output is? (Toeplitz 2004, 21).

Naturally, Toeplitz's text does not pose a sequence of questions, but veiled statements or rather declarations *I believe that…* or *I am inclined to believe that…*), compare the version of the above fragment of the text in the form of affirmative sentences:

> The aim of each literary piece is an attempt at answering the question: "Who is man? It is as – as my Master, Leszek Kołakowski put it – that when looking into a well filled with water, above all I see my own reflection. This metaphor probably determines the answer to the question what the aim of literary output is.

B. Batko-Tokarz (2009, 116 and others) writes similarly of the persuasive use of questions (for instance their accusatory function) in the Seym discourse and E. Hentschel distinguishes the "Bestimmungsfragen" category in the German language, that is of statements in the form of interrogative sentences (1998, 81 and others). Compare:

> Was hat sie nicht schon alles erlebt! = Sie hat schon viel erlebt 'She has lived through so much already'.

2.5. Expositive vs. verdictive speech acts

Verdictive utterances constitute the expression of evaluations which become a point of informing the addressee. Provided that in the case of evaluative declaratives the evaluation is contained in the nominative utterance and can become an object of negation, in case of verdictives the evaluation is expressed directly in the content of the performative verb. Compare:

> (constative not containing the semantics of evaluation) I know that Jan likes singing.

> (evaluative declarative) I believe Jan sings well.

> (verdictive) I think highly of your musical abilities.

Evaluative speech acts are founded on evaluative verbs: *I evaluate* (*positively, negatively etc.*), *I accuse, I impute, I condemn, I judge, I praise, I accept, I criticize, I reject* etc., and neutral speech acts – on verbs which due to the axiological semantics are not marked: *I state, I inform, I emphasize, I reprimand* etc. Compare:

> I evaluate the Radom action positively – I claim that I know of the Radom action.

> This time I praise the Cracovian television – I repeat that I know of the initiative of the Cracovian television.

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Mr MP, I am not criticizing, I am only expressing astonishment.

A special case of verdictive speech acts constitutes an act of boasting which, as a rule, is not realized with the aid of an interactive operator: the use of the verb *I boast* would be in opposition to the principle of politeness (modesty) binding in interpersonal conversations. The linguistic subject tends to avoid the use of this verb or it simply employs it in a highly mannered style together with the expression of negation which – paradoxically – does not change the basic intention of the speaker, which is connected with the positive passing judgement on oneself. Compare. (examples from the Internet):

He gave me a "medicament" and after this "medicament" my problem and the small pustule are gone. I can knock again like a horse, Sir, without wishing to boast!

And, with all due modesty, I could repeat a few tricks that Mr Drzymalski demonstrated.

I was then in the 6th class of primary school and – without wishing to boast – I did well from the very beginning.

The use of evaluations must take place in accordance with the politeness requirement of linguistic patterns of behaviour. Therefore, acts of deprecating one's communicative partner are usually realized indirectly – the speaker does not even always have at his/her disposal appropriate linguistic manifestations of critical attitudes towards the addressee. There is a frequently encountered phenomenon when the conditional form of deliberative verbs is used for that purpose. Compare.:

Premier Putin wspomina również o „tragicznych losach żołnierzy rosyjskich, dostali się do niewoli podczas wojny 1920 r." Gdybym był złośliwy, przypomniałbym, że w 1941 r., w poszukiwaniach symetrii krzywd polsko-rosyjskich Józef Wissarionowicz Stalin przypomniał gen. Władysławowi Sikorskiemu o obecności Polaków na Kremlu i polskiej okupacji Moskwy w pierwszych latach XVII w. (Adam Michnik – „Gazeta Wyborcza". 1 IX 2009).

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[Prime Minister Putin also mentions the tragic fate of the Russian soldiers, they were captured during the war of 1920 r." *If I were malicious, I would remind you that* in 1941, while looping for the symmetry of the Polish-Russian wrong, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin reminded gen. Władysław Sikorski of the presence of Poles on the Kremlin and the Polish occupation of Moscow in the first years of the 18th century.]

Rather unacceptable – in a given communicative situation – was a direct form of expressing criticism towards the opponent:

I maliciously remind you that …

Linguistic politeness often conditions also the elimination of the verb manifestations of negative evaluations from the surface structure utterances. For instance, in the Polish cultural circle a directly uttered formal accusation, e.g. with the use of the performative verb *I accuse,* is rarely encountered. There is a tendency to avoid the construction with an interactive operator, however for

the purpose of accusing the addressee of anything indirect speech acts are used as a rule, for instance those that have a content of verdictive of informal utterances. Compare:

> Mr M P, I accuse you of having bad intentions.

> You had bad intentions, Mr M P.

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One cannot agree with N. Zhuravleva's (2008: 143) statement that an accusation poses a kind of reactive acts. Naturally, the intention of an accusation, just as – in general - any evaluative act, comes into being against a particular interactive background, but the reasons causing the accusation (generally: a negative evaluation) can have extremely remote sources from the direct communicative situation.

2.6. Obligative vs. deliberative speech acts

Within the causative speech acts two classes can be distinguished – depending on whether the object of influence is identical with the announcement transmitted. In case of obligative acts which can also be qualified as causative (see Vazques-Orta and others 2004: 51), the fact of linguistic activity is not identical with its result: through speaking particular states of affairs are caused, for instance one exerts an influence on one's communicative partner or on oneself. A typical example of such speech acts are directives: requests, demands, proposals etc.

Deliberative speech acts, party belonging to expositives introduced by Austin are closed within themselves so to speak because the speaker– using a performative verb – qualifies a currently realized linguistic activity in this way. A linguistic activity is identical with its result. Compare:

I'm saying, listen then!

I'm *finishing* this call/conversation already!

Let me start from reminding you of the fact that the radio lost its concession.

Provided speech acts of the first type are extraverted, e.g. directed to the exterior of a linguistic communication, speech acts of the second type – introversive, consisting in the manifestation of a linguistic activity whose object is the announcement itself. That is why they can be also qualified as meta-linguistic acts. This purpose is fulfilled by performative verbs as well as those containing such verbs of word groups: *I say, I repeat, I pronounce, I conclude, I continue with this train of thought, I finish* (*a story*), *I begin* (*a chapter*), *I continue, I allude, I defend, I explain, I confess, I utter, I open a discussion, I admit* etc.

Some of the verbs cited can also function in descriptive expressions (see the next point), for instance *to repeat*:

> Let me repeat it once again that you are a clever boy.

The speaker's communicative aim here is passing on information to the information ("You are a clever boy") to the addressee, however the performative verb indicates that the speaker does it again. In similar informative sentences the assertive part is always marked out and it can be accepted or negated. Compare:

> — I am telling you yet again that you are a clever boy. — It is not true, I am not a clever boy.

2.7. Descriptive vs. declarative speech acts

Within the range of expositive speech acts two subclasses can be distinguished: declarative and descriptive speech acts or constating ones (however, G. Beck associates constatives with declaratives, see 1980, 39 and others). In both cases the addressee is transmitted the information of states of affairs, yet constatives inform of states of affairs objectively taking place in the physical, physiological, social or psychical reality. Compare:

> The old woman is running like a little girl.

> There are stags in this forest.

Declaratives inform of intensional attitudes of communication subjects which can be generalized in the notion of *deontic modality* as it was described in the theory of functional syntax (Kiklewicz 2004, 169 and others). Manifestations of deontic modality can be divided into four classes:

1. epistemic operators *I know, I am convinced, I regard, I believe, I suppose, I presume, I assume, I think, I want, I doubt* etc;
2. sensory operators *I see, I hear, I sense* etc.;
3. emotive operators *I enjoy, I am worried, I fear, it makes me laugh that, I am indifferent to, I sympathize* etc.;
4. evaluative operators *I value, I appreciate, I fancy, I hate, I like* etc.

In E. Weigand's classification (1989, 116 and others) constatives correspond to assertives whose function consists in stating facts.

The border between constatives and declaratives is not that obvious, it especially pertains to constating concrete utterances, perceived states of affairs as well as declarative utterances, containing a verb of perception. For instance:

> Constative: The old woman is running like a little girl.

> Declarative: (I can see very well) that the old woman is running like a little girl.

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Even though in the perceptive predicate is absent in the surface structure of the first sentence, it is obvious that stating a fact is possible thanks to its direct observation by the speaker. It means that the perceptive predicate is also coded in the content of the constating expression. Compare the transformation:

> I inform/I state that the old woman is running like a little girl – on the basis of what I see, I observe the old woman is running like a little girl.

Distinguishing the categories of speech acts examined here can facilitate the use of cognitive presentation, namely the notion of *profiling*. In case of constatives profiling an event is described, that is why to agreement or disagreement of the assertive content of utterance with the real state of affairs, that is the truthfulness meaning comes to the fore. In the content of constatives the background poses the state of perception of the speaker and the event is located in the foreground, that is – in our case in question – whatever happens with the participation of the old woman. It can be presented in terms of R. Langacker's cognitive grammar (TR – trajectory, LM – landmark) (as for other connections between pragmalinguistics and cognitive sciences see: Pachocińska 2007: 110) (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Profiling a referential situation in the constating utterance

Figure 4. Profiling a referential situation in a constating utterance

In this case informing is as important as perceiving the event, that is a conjunction of two predicates takes place:

> I see and I inform that the old woman is running like a little girl.

In case of declarative sentences in the foreground located is the speaker's state of perception, that is why a dependence of predicates takes place here:

> I inform that I see the old woman running like a little girl.

The information of the speaker's perceptive state can be reinforced, for instance with the aid of particles or linking expressions:

> I also see that the old woman is running like a little girl.

Even I see the old woman running like a little girl.

> But I see the old woman running like a little girl.

> I already see the old woman running like a little girl.

Compare the presentation of this state of affairs with the aid of the category of trajectory and landmark (Figure 4).

Let us examine the following example (joke):

> At a party the husband comes back from the buffet table for the third time running with a heaping plate. At last the wife cannot stand it any more:
> — Aren't you ashamed what people will think of you?

— No, I tell them it's for you.

It is worth comparing the above dialogue with a different communicative situation:

(husband, passing his wife a plate with some food) *Here you are*.

Whereas in the first case the speaker informs in what way he explains his behaviour, namely by telling untruth, in the other situation we deal with the constatation of fact (additionally also with a proposal).

Generally speaking, the criterion of truth with reference to declarative sentences, in particular perceptive ones, has a different content than with reference to constative sentences. Whereas, in case of constatives truth/falsity has a social dimension, thus to a certain degree (although probably – never in absolute) an objective one because it comes into being as a result of a comparison of points of view, in case of declaratives truth/falsity has a subjective character, that is it signifies the frankness of the speaker.

In a similar way declaratives differ from a mental (epistemic) predicate, e.g. containing such modal verbs as *I reckon, I think, I believe, I consider, I doubt, I share a view* etc., as well as utterances constating general states of affairs (so-called characterizing ones). In fact, generic sentences contain a modal verb in their semantic structure. Compare:

The French are the least athletic European nation.

It is obvious that in this case a particular mental point of view is expressed – the very semantics of characterizing sentences requires the presence of the intentional subject. Compare the transformation:

It is well known that/it is believed that the French are the least athletic European nation.

In constating sentences an event is profiled in the foreground, namely a repetitive, sometimes an omnitemporal state of affairs, whereas in declarative sentences the mental state of the communicative subject is profiled. The above cited illustration can be transformed as follows:

It is well/commonly known and I inform that *the* French are the least athletic European nation.

In case of declarative utterances the conjunction of predicates *it is commonly known* and *I inform* is replaced by their dependence:

I am also of the opinion that the French are the least athletic European nation = I inform (you) that I also believe that the French are the least athletic European nation.

As can be seen, in constating utterances the subject of informing is the objective state of affairs, and in declarative utterances – the intentional state of the speaker.

Within the range of constatives and declaratives several classes can be distinguished depending on the cognitive competencies of the speaker and receiver.

Situation A: X knows of S, Y does not know of S.
X wants and acts in such a way that Y learns of S./X wants Y to learn about S. and acts accordingly.
Speech act: statement, declaration, informing; reminding

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Illustration: *I declare that I familiarized myself with the regulations; I remind you that it is Tuesday today.*

SITUATION B: X knows of S, Y knows of S

X wants Y to know about S (still) and acts accordingly, wishing the former to pay attention (again) to S

Speech act: repetition

Illustration: (*Once again*) I *am telling you that I am staying.*

SITUATION C: X does not know of S, Y know of S

X wants Y (still) to know that X does not know of S; (optionally) X acts in such a way that Y helps him to gain knowledge of S or to cope in a situation in which the knowledge of S is required.

Speech act: declaration of ignorance, often a hybrid speech act: declaration of a lack of indispensable knowledge in a particular situation as well as an appeal to the addressee

Illustration: (answer during an examination) *I do not know the answer to the second question; I do not how it is screwed on.*

SITUATION D: X does not know of S, Y does not know of S

X wants Y (still) to know that X and acts accordingly), similarly as Y, does not know of S

Speech act: (reactive) refusal to answer, resignation

Illustration: — *What is capitalism? — I don't know either.*

2.8. Directive vs. commissive speech acts

Directive speech acts are addressed to another (usually physical) person the speaker establishes an interactive relation with. In case of commissive speech acts introduced by Austin we deal with the communicative feedback reflexivity, that is a situation in which the speaker imposes limitations onto himself/herself, for instance in the form of making a commitment, a promise, an oath, an assurance, a pledge etc. Thus, he/she commits himself/herself towards the partner not only to do something but also to stop doing something. In the work of 1965 Searle presented nine conditions of fulfilling a promise, from among which the most important is, as can be assumed, the condition of particular motivation: "Both for the speaker as well as for the receiver it is not obvious that the speaker will carry out a task during a normal course of events", as well as the condition of frankness: "The speaker has an intention via his/her utterance to commit himself/herself to perform a particular task".

As opposed to directives commissive acts (realized with the aid verbs *I promise, I guarantee, I assure, I swear, I commit myself, I pledge* etc.) rarely occur as independent of the communicative context – they usually complement the already existing sequences, thus they constitute a kind of perlocution, for instance with reference to declaratives (accusations) manifesting a critical stand.

2.9. Initiative vs. reactive speech acts

Speech acts of the first type, for instance various kinds of declarations, are autonomic in relation to the sequence of events, they can occur in its initial phases. However, such speech acts such as answer, remark, agreement, disagreement, refusal, support and others have a reactive character and require a particular communicative background. In other words, they pose a continuation of the already embarked on interaction. They can be also treated as perlocutions, encoded in the content of other speech acts. For instance,

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the act of proposal assumes a perlocutionary reaction of the receiver: his/her agreement or refusal. Among others the so-called nodding during a course of conversation has a reactive character. Its function frequently consists solely in signalling that the communicative partner's replies are received, that the participation in the conversation lasts. Compare the examples:

> Yes, yes.
> I see.
> Of course!
> You are right.

2.10. Extensional vs. intensional speech acts

From among the informative (descriptive) speech acts it is possible to distinguish two classes: extensional ones serve for transmitting information of states of affairs taking place in the physical reality, sometimes with the participation of the speaker, for instance:

> [I inform that] the Council of Ministers examined that bill and it passed it on 23 July.

> [I inform that] The work in question proceeded in accordance with the existing legal state.

> [I inform that] I called Mr Adam Michnik on my own initiative.

With the aid of intensional speech acts the addressee is informed of states and events in the speaker's "inner" world, that is of his/her predispositions and physiological or psychical conditions. Compare:

> [I inform you that I] I Love you.
> [I inform you that] I Feel much better.

[I inform you that] I have a migraine.

The difference of the above mentioned types of speech acts among others consists in that in case of extensional ones the verification of the information does not cause fundamental difficulties as a rule, at any rate it is accessible both to the receiver as well as third parties. Compare:

> — [I inform that] The above mentioned work proceeded in accordance with the binding legal system. — It's not true, it did not proceed in accordance with the legal state — I checked it.

However, in case of intensional acts one can only think indirectly of the credibility of the speaker's statement, namely on the basis of the symptoms of the states and psychical or physiological processes presented. In this case the category of truth (and the category of untruth) is replaced by the category of truthfulness (non-truthfulness) of the communicative subject. Provided truth/untruth can (although it need not) have a conventional character, truthfulness/untruthfulness is a category of the subjective interpretation of the semantics of utterances. Compare:

> I am honestly telling you that I am feeling much better now.
> *I am honestly telling you that it is raining.
> — I love you. — You are not saying that sincerely.
> — It is raining. — *You are not saying that sincerely.

Intensional acts are related to other types of linguistic patterns of behaviour so sometimes an explicit qualification of a linguistic activity to a particular category is

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not possible. For instance, a declaration of love could be treated as an act of informing the addressee of the emotional state of the speaker. What is more, the declaration of love – as opposed to distinguishing it from other intensional informatives – most frequently assumes perlocution, e.g. a certain reaction of the addressee – in the verbal or non-verbal shape.

56 A declaration of love has a lot in common with evaluative acts – they indirectly evaluate the addressee positively ("I fancy you"), with directive acts, in particular with proposal or request ("I love you and please: do not leave me ever again"). This element of linguistic patterns of behaviour is used in commercials as a tool of persuasion and manipulation. P. H. Lewiński (1999, 54) writes of the mechanism of the emotionalization of reception used in commercials consisting, among others in adulating recipients".

2.11. Appellative vs. creative speech acts

Appellative speech acts, for instance request or even demand are based on the cooperation of the speaker and receiver, however creative speech acts have a decision-making, voluntative character. Speech acts whose aim is regulating social relation, establishing or annulling certain principles, norms, rules of functioning of a society. To a certain degree speech acts of this type correspond to the exersitives in Austin's classification. It refers to utterances usually functioning in the range of institutional communication (see Holly 2001, 44), founded on such performative predicates as *I legislate, I state, I appoint, I dismiss, I manage, I enact, I annul, I sever, I dissolve, I forgive, I pardon, I let somebody off, I agree with somebody, I nominate, I withdraw, I capitulate* etc. When it comes to the above mentioned type M. Marcjanik applied the notion of *the creative function of speech*:

I ascribe the creative function to such linguistic utterances whose very fact of existence […] in an automatic way causes the coming into being of objective states of affairs in the extralinguistic reality […] Thus, they are legal as well as quasi-legal states – putting it in general terms – brought about with the aid of speaking/ writing. Concrete states established by laws, directives, acts of donation, citizenship examination, sales contracts, wills etc. formulated in writing (1988, 97 and others).

Creative effects can result from the content of other speech acts, for instance declarative utterances: a declaration of the speaker's emotional state can cause changes of relations between the speaker and the addressee. For instance, expressing a negative evaluation of the state of affairs can simultaneously signify the withdrawal from the participation in it on the part of the speaker.

2.12. Cooperative vs. esoteric (magic) speech acts

Influencing one's partner can be direct, realized in the form of an announcement addressed to him/her as it can be observed on the example of request, proposal, advice or demand. Moreover, there exist situations of an indirect influence on one's partner – through appealing to third parties, usually to the so-called circumstances outside one's control:

> May God bless and protect you.
> To hell with him!

Speech acts of the esoteric influence are excommunications, curses, anathemas and

Name of speech act	Initial sitiation, initiator	Consequences of performance	Limitation of freedom of activity	Control – symmetry or asymmetry
Request	speaker, assuming receiver's possibilities	speaker's benefit or less frequently – mutual benefit	limitation, receiver's obligation	asymmetry, receiver's advantage
Begging	speaker, attaching great significance to an activity	speaker's benefit, rarely mutual benefit	slight limitation, speaker's obligation	asymmetry, receiver's advantage
Order, demand	speaker, assuming receiver's lack of will	speaker's benefit and possible sanctions for the addressee for disobedience	strong limitation, receiver's obligation	asymmetry, speaker's strong advantage
Warning	speaker, assuming receiver's possibilities and willingness (disadvantageous to him/her), and also his lack of knowledge of danger	receiver's benefit	limitation, receiver's obligation	asymmetry, speaker's advantage
Threat	speaker, assuming receiver's lack of willingness (disadvantageous to speaker)	speaker's benefit	strong limitation, receiver's obligation	asymmetry, speaker's adavantage
Encouragement	speaker, assuming receiver's possibilities and willingness	receiver's benefit or mutual benefit	slight limitation, receiver's obligation	slight asymmetry, receiver's advantage
Permission	speaker, assuming receiver's willingness, aspiration	receiver's benefit	annulling receiver's limitations	asymmetry, speaker's strong advantage
Prohibition	speaker, assuming receiver's willingness, habits	speaker's benefit and possible sanctions for the addressee for disobedience	strong limitation , receiver's obligation	asymmetry, speaker's strong advantage
Proposal	speaker, assuming receiver's possibilities	mutual benefit	receiver's slight obligation; at least a verbal reaction is expected, for instance justification of refusal	equality, symmetry
Offer	speaker, assuming receiver's possibilities, demand	mutual benefit	none	asymmetry, speaker's slight advantage
Advice, instruction, recommendation	speaker, assuming receiver's demands	receiver's benefit	receiver's slight obligation	assymetry, receiver's advantage

Table 5. Cooperative speech acts

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other linguistic activities, magical in their essence.

Naturally, in interpersonal communication most frequently acts of speech of cooperative influence occur most frequently. Speech acts belonging to this group can be arranged on the pattern of the Awdiejew–Nęcki classification (see the previous point) (Table 5).

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CONCLUSION

The concept presented is based on the assumption that speech acts can be catego-

rized on a number of levels. I distinguished three levels of their categorization: 1) super-ordinate, e.g. the level of homogenous classes in terms of the pragmatic function of speech acts; 2) ordinate – the level of speech acts (such as request, demand, declaration, threat etc.); 3) subordinate, e.g. the level of varieties of speech acts or sub-acts. In accordance with the accepted assumption the complete classification of speech acts ought to have at its disposal well-ordered categories of speech acts at each of these levels.

In this part of book I mainly dealt with the classification of speech acts on the superordinate level. Here I applied the idea

1. Intentional acts	1.1. Communicative acts	1.1.1. Representational acts	1.1.1.1. Expositive acts	1.1.1.1.1. Declarative acts	1.1.1.1.1.1. Initiative acts	
					1.1.1.1.1.2. Reactive acts	
				1.1.1.1.2. Descriptive acts	1.1.1.1.2.1. Extentional acts	
					1.1.1.1.2.2. Intentional acts	
			1.1.1.2. Verdictive acts			
		1.1.2. Casusative acts	1.1.2.1. Obligative acts	1.1.2.1.1. Directive acts	1.1.2.1.1.1. Appellative acts	1.1.2.1.1.1.1. Cooperative acts
						1.1.2.1.1.2. Magical acts
				1.1.2.1.1.2. Creative acts		
			1.1.2.1.2. Commissive acts			
			1.1.2.2. Deliberative acts			
	1.2. Non-communicative acts					
2. Conventional acts	2.1. Polite acts					
	2.2. Customary acts					

Table 6.

of hierarchization of the interactive grammar category put proposed by A. Awdiejew, deepening it in such a way that the system of particular taxons is based on the principle of the hierarchy of oppositions concerning particular types of pragmatic function. While realizing this principle, I introduced

ten oppositions of speech acts (see the table below) (Table 6).

The basic level of the system of speech acts was described in the article presented selectively, above all – directives and representatives. As far as the subordinate level is concerned, it was merely mentioned here.

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summary

Σ **The stratificational classificaction of speech acts**

The author discusses the problem of speech acts classification on the basis of the pragmatic function. The relevant elements of context, on the example control of the announcement directly to target addressee or to third parties, are also taken into account. The classification of speech acts proposed by the author has a dichotomous as well as a hierarchic character. The author distinguishes and describes the following types of speech acts: inventional vs. conventional; communicative vs. uncommunicative; polite vs. customary; representative vs. performative; expositive vs. verdictive; causative vs. deliberative; descriptive vs. declarative; directive vs. commissive; initiative vs. reactive; extentional vs. intentional; appellative vs. creative; cooperative vs. magic.

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