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## Prospects for the International Communist Movement

*Submitted by the*  
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**Abstaining:**

The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB, the subject being outside of his jurisdiction.

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# Prospects for the International Communist Movement

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## PROSPECTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COM- MUNIST MOVEMENT

### THE PROBLEM

To examine the situation and probable developments in the world Communist movement.

### CONCLUSIONS

A. The international Communist movement is now openly split into majority and minority factions oriented respectively toward the Russians and the Chinese. It is also disturbed by other factors, such as the weakening of Soviet authority in Eastern Europe, the example of Yugoslavia, and the independent inclinations of a number of Communist parties, notably the Communist Party of Italy. (*Paras. 1-16*)

B. The Sino-Soviet dispute will probably continue to have its ups and downs, and in certain circumstances relations between the two states might improve considerably. However, the rift is so deep and the national interest of each party so heavily engaged that there is now virtually no chance of reconciliation under the present leaders. The international movement may now be on the eve of a formal split, but whether or not this step is taken, the bitter struggle for control and influence over the Communist parties will continue. Further tension in state relations between China and the USSR also seems likely, especially on the common frontier. The demise of either or both of the present leaders would offer some prospect of temporary amelioration of the dispute, but we believe that the fundamental differences between the two powers would remain (*Paras. 2-5*)

C. The international Communist movement as a whole is likely to be characterized by increased dispersion of authority

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and by more independent conduct by various parties. Although Soviet power remains a major factor in Eastern Europe, further manifestations of autonomous and nationalist behavior will probably occur. Among the parties out of power, we foresee a trend toward regionalism—as in the Far East, but also perhaps in Western Europe and Latin America. The Sino-Soviet competition for influence will in some cases lead to further splits within individual parties. At the same time, Moscow and Peiping will remain powerful sources of material support for their followers, and will retain considerable operational influence on a bilateral basis. (*Paras. 11, 24-25, 29-33*)

D. For the non-Communist world this situation offers important advantages and some dangers. The assertion of divergent national interests by Communist powers offers an opportunity for the West to deal profitably with some of them individually. The Sino-Soviet conflict is increasingly absorbing the energies of the USSR and Communist China and diverting them from sharp contentions with the major Western powers.<sup>1</sup> Among the nongoverning parties, a few have already suffered severe setbacks as a result of the conflict. On the other hand, some Communist parties will become more effective and will gain greater freedom of action and respectability because of their more independent status. While in some countries the parties will tend to lose their rationale and élan, in others they will probably emerge as more formidable revolutionary organizations, though more national than international in character. Regardless of internal quarrels, Communists will retain an underlying enmity toward the West if only because their convictions are in so many respects incompatible with traditional Western concepts of political and economic life. (*Paras. 37-40*)

E. In general, we foresee the emergence of a variety of Communists and Communist parties, some chiefly influenced by Moscow or Peiping, some largely autonomous. In conducting their relations with Communist states and forming their policies toward revolutionary movements, the principal non-Communist powers will probably find it increasingly advantageous to judge

<sup>1</sup> For discussion of the impact of the conflict on Soviet and Chinese foreign policy, see NIE 11-9-64, "Soviet Foreign Policy," dated 19 February 1964, and NIE 13-63, "Problems and Prospects in Communist China," dated 1 May 1963.

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each particular situation on its own merits, rather than on the assumptions which generally prevailed when Moscow unquestionably dominated the international movement. This situation offers new opportunities and advantages to Western policy, but it presents new dangers and difficulties as well. (*Paras. 40-43*)



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## DISCUSSION

### I. INTRODUCTION

1. The international Communist movement, once an apparently monolithic organization subservient to Stalin, has split apart under pressure of a conflict between the two chief Communist powers. There are variations and independent tendencies within the two contending groups of Communist states; in the free world, many Communist parties are tending to look more and more to their own local and regional interests. It is virtually out of the question that unity can be re-established on the old terms; the main question now is what forms the growing diversification will take.

### II. THE COMMUNIST STATES

#### The Sino-Soviet Dispute

2. The emergence into the open of the dispute between the USSR and Communist China marked a major stage in the disruption of the unity of the international Communist movement. The present phase of this dispute dates back at least to the 20th Party Congress and Khrushchev's reinterpretation of basic policies and doctrines. Even under Stalin serious differences had existed, but not until 1959 did the latent antagonisms become a critical and open issue. We can identify a wide variety of factors, and no single cause is predominant. Longstanding conflicts of national interest have played a role, together with old cultural and racial antagonisms. More recently, the Chinese have challenged the Soviet claim to exercise controlling authority in the international Communist movement. The quarrel was greatly stimulated by the refusal of the USSR to provide China with the means to become a nuclear power, and its failure aggressively to support Chinese national ambitions. There is also a bitter personal rivalry between Khrushchev and Mao. The dispute, therefore, is a mixture of ideological, national, and personal conflicts, which explains its fundamental character.

3. Each year has seen a deepening of the conflict and a further deterioration in party and state relations. Last year both sides discarded the device of indirect attack and made open denunciations. An attempt at bilateral negotiations was doomed beforehand, and quickly broke down. Since then the Chinese have built up a voluminous record of charges against the Soviet party, government, and Khrushchev personally. The Soviets have recently renewed their maneuvering to isolate China and possibly organize an international conference of condemnation. The Chinese have openly recognized various dissenting Communist groups as legitimate parties, thereby laying the ground-

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work for their own international network of parties. In essence, a *de facto* division has already occurred between the Chinese and Soviet parties, and between their respective allies.

4. It is clear that the Sino-Soviet split is so deep and the national interest of each party so heavily engaged that there is now virtually no chance of reconciliation under the present leaders. The international movement may now be on the eve of a formal split, though the precise manner in which this might occur is still unclear.<sup>2</sup> In any case the bitter struggle will almost certainly continue, regardless of its organizational form, with each side seizing opportunities to impair the prestige and influence of the other. State relations must suffer as a result. Political and economic relations are already minimal. Military relations have deteriorated to the point where the value of the alliance to either power is questionable, though this is not to say that the Soviets would withhold support from the Chinese in a situation where they considered their own vital interests to be endangered. Both powers are likely to become increasingly concerned about the security of their common frontier. Attempts at subversion among national minorities across this frontier have already occurred. We believe that neither side expects to undertake major military action against the other, but border clashes of significant proportions may take place. The Chinese are undoubtedly more concerned about Soviet military power than the Soviets are about Chinese, and we do not exclude the possibility that the Soviets at some point may try to intimidate the Chinese by military action on the border.

5. Despite the present intensity of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the quarrel will still probably have its ups and downs, and in certain circumstances relations might improve considerably. The demise of Mao Tse-tung would open the way for his successors to tone down the dispute, if they were so inclined, and the need for economic and military help might impel the successor regime to such action. Similarly, Khrushchev's successors might want a *modus vivendi* with China so they could concentrate on other matters. However, we doubt that any of the prospective successors could view the basic issues much differently than the present regimes. A meaningful compromise would involve major concessions and a repudiation of much that has happened. Any arrangement reached by new leaders, therefore, would be largely a working

<sup>2</sup> Defining the final step becomes more difficult as fewer and fewer steps remain to be taken. It now may be a question of formal condemnation of the Chinese by a majority of the parties in a meeting, excommunication of the Soviets by a formal meeting of the Chinese and their supporters, or formal action by the Soviet or Chinese Central Committee severing party ties.

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arrangement rather than any resolution of fundamental differences, which would almost certainly remain.<sup>3</sup>

#### The Other Communist Powers

6. Within the Communist world the basic split is reflected inside both Soviet and Chinese camps, and each side can exert some influence in the other's sphere. The Soviets continue to hold sway over East Europe, minus Albania. The Communist Chinese are predominant in Asia, except for Mongolia. Then there is Yugoslavia, itself a cause of disagreement, formally nonaligned in the world, but accepted by the Soviet sphere as a legitimate Socialist state. And there is also Cuba, publicly loyal to the USSR but advocating a militant policy more in accord with the views of the CPR.

#### The Soviet Camp

7. The Soviet ability to control even sympathetic Communist countries has been declining. In discarding Stalin's methods, the Soviets were led to emphasize the concept of a Bloc held together by willing cooperation rather than by coercion. Khrushchev's idea was of a vague commonwealth of Communist countries, autonomous in internal matters, but bound to the USSR by common ideological goals and foreign policies. This commonwealth was to embrace elements from both right and left, including Yugoslavia as well as China and Albania. An inherent contradiction in the concept between "equal" status and subservience to Moscow has made practical implementation difficult, and this dilemma has been greatly accentuated by the dispute with China. Nevertheless, Khrushchev is still advancing the idea of a commonwealth, though his acceptance of Yugoslavia as a member has made Chinese and Albanian participation all but impossible.

8. As the Sino-Soviet conflict has developed, a number of East European regimes have become aware that their bargaining power has grown with the need of the Soviets for support against China, and they have become more assertive. Surprisingly, the country which has exploited this situation most vigorously has been Rumania, previously considered one of the most submissive of Satellites. Rumania successfully defied Moscow last year, refusing to abandon its plan for broad industrial development or even to adjust it to the requirements of CEMA.<sup>4</sup> It indicated that its support in the Soviet dispute with China was not to be taken for granted. Faced with such insubordination, the Soviets

<sup>3</sup>The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation takes the position that, based on the evidence now available, it is premature to conclude that any arrangement reached by new leaders in the Soviet Union and Communist China would be largely a working arrangement rather than a resolution of fundamental differences.

<sup>4</sup>Council for Economic Mutual Assistance.

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gave way, postponing their plans for integrating the Bloc economies and for establishing a central planning authority for CEMA.

9. This concession only enhanced the nationalistic inclinations of the Rumanian leaders. More and more, their policies have shown an independent bent, occasionally manifested in an anti-Soviet manner. On the whole, they have supported Soviet positions on foreign policy and ideological questions but not on the key one of disciplining the Peiping regime. They have attempted to mediate the Sino-Soviet dispute—an attempt which has enhanced their independent status and caused considerable embarrassment to the Soviets. Most recently, the party leaders have gone so far as publicly to condemn both China and the USSR for their actions in the dispute.

10. There are, of course, important constraints upon independent behavior by the Satellites. Soviet military power remains dominant in the area. The East European countries are bound to one another and to the USSR by mutual commitments under the Warsaw Pact. The Satellite economies continue to be closely linked with that of the USSR; indeed, economic cooperation and specialization is favored in one respect or another by all the Satellites, even though there are disagreements over CEMA policies. They do not all necessarily wish to follow policies at odds with those of Moscow; generally they are content to follow Moscow's lead on major issues of international policy—for example, on the German question.

11. In spite of these considerations, Moscow's difficulties in maintaining a satisfactory degree of control over developments in Eastern Europe will almost certainly increase. Differences among the East European countries themselves are becoming more apparent. Cultural and political ferment in Czechoslovakia has aroused alarm in the East German regime, lest the disturbing tendencies spread to that country. Recent moves by various Communist countries to improve their relations with West Germany have drawn a public rebuke from leaders of the East German regime. The historic rivalries and national antagonisms of Eastern Europe will to an increasing degree tend to disturb Communist unity in that area.<sup>5</sup>

12. Yugoslavia has been one of the strongest Soviet supporters in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Partly as a consequence of this, Yugoslav political and economic ties with other East European regimes and with the USSR have been renewed and considerably strengthened in recent years. The Soviets dropped their previous demand that in return for a closer relationship with the Soviet Bloc countries, Yugoslavia should hew more closely to the Soviet line. This new relationship is advantageous to Belgrade because it raises the prestige of Yugoslavia's in-

<sup>5</sup> For further discussion of developments in Eastern Europe, see NIE 12-64, "The Outlook in Eastern Europe," scheduled for July 1964.

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dependent Communist road, especially in Eastern Europe. Another consequence has been that the Yugoslavs have shown themselves willing on occasion to use their influence in underdeveloped areas, particularly in Africa, in behalf of Soviet international positions. We believe that this arrangement suits both sides, and that the Soviets will not demand, nor will the Yugoslavs agree to relinquish, their independence or freedom of maneuver.

13. Outer Mongolia is the only Asian Communist country which is firmly in the Soviet camp. The Soviet advantage here is that the Mongols fear the Chinese more than they do the Soviets. Moreover, they appreciate the fact that the Soviets, under Khrushchev, have done much to help Outer Mongolia develop. The USSR is likely to retain primary influence over developments in the MPR, but the Chinese will continue to have some leverage because of the Mongolian desire to avoid complete subjection to Moscow.

#### The Chinese Bloc

14. As compared with 1960, when China had only a few hesitant supporters, the Chinese now can be said to have a "camp." Oddly enough, their strongest and most unequivocal supporter is in Eastern Europe. Albania's extremism and its strong support for China has been largely a reflection of its fear that it will be left to the mercies of Yugoslavia, whose large Albanian minority provides a potential rival ruling group as an alternative to the Hoxha regime. In China's more immediate sphere of influence, the Chinese position in North Korea and North Vietnam is not as strong as the long-established Soviet position in Eastern Europe. During the past year North Korea has subscribed almost completely to Chinese positions and its relations with China have grown closer. At the same time, its relations with the Soviets have cooled, and there have been indications of Soviet economic pressure and even of attempts to subvert the North Korean leadership. Nevertheless, the Soviets still retain an important military tie with the country, and they continue to supply it with certain items of military aid. Chinese influence will probably continue to be paramount in North Korea, but the Koreans will not wish an irretrievable break with Moscow if they can avoid it.

15. From the beginning, North Vietnam has struggled to stay neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute, and has found it more and more difficult to do so. Proximity to China and the pressures of the war in South Vietnam impel the North Vietnamese party toward China's side. It now espouses Chinese views on most doctrinal issues in the dispute. However, its stand is somewhat less extreme than North Korea's, and it continues to trade with and to receive aid from the USSR and the East European Satellites. Ho Chi Minh has tried to prevent a formal Sino-Soviet split, probably because he fears that such a split would result

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in his coming under Chinese control. We believe that North Vietnam will continue to side with the Chinese on most issues, but that Hanoi will seek to maintain its ties with Moscow and to avoid too close a Chinese embrace.

#### Cuba

16. Castro has publicly supported a number of important Soviet positions, although he is not fully committed to the Soviet side. Both the Soviets and the Chinese are acutely conscious of Cuba's importance in the Communist movement in Latin America, and each has actively sought Cuba's support; the Soviets have used Cuban economic and military dependence on the USSR as a means of persuasion. Despite the extent of this dependence, however, the Cubans continue to maintain cordial relations with the Chinese. The interest of the Castro regime in militant struggle in Latin America causes it frequently to take positions consonant with those of China. We believe that Castroite revolutionary doctrine will continue to conflict from time to time with the tactics of the USSR and its Communist supporters in Cuba and, more generally, in Latin America.

### III. TRENDS AMONG THE NONGOVERNING COMMUNIST PARTIES

17. The image of Communist unity, together with the authority and universality of Communist dogma, have always been of great importance for the morale of Communists and for the appeal of their movement to potential supporters. This has been true despite a long history of factional discord. Accordingly, the existence of two distinct sources of doctrine with conflicting precepts has caused many Communist parties to be increasingly divided, confused, and disoriented. Many Communist leaders (like members of any political movement which is openly split) are alarmed at the open rift, believing that it endangers their control over their parties and damages the prospect of victory for their cause.

18. Both the Soviets and the Chinese are actively engaged throughout the world in attempts to proselytize party members to their views. In this contest the Soviets still have the support of most party leaders and organizations. Among some 90 Communist parties (including those in power) only 11 or 12 can now be counted as members of the Chinese "camp," and most of these are in Asia. But the Chinese have supporters among the membership of almost all parties, and Chinese arguments raise doubts about the correctness of Soviet leadership. The very existence of a rival Chinese line tends to weaken established parties by providing an alternative to Soviet authority. Generally speaking, the Chinese position has more inherent appeal to militantly revolutionary groups than do the more cautious Soviet tactics.

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19. In some of the nongoverning parties the Sino-Soviet dispute has simply accentuated longstanding factional divisions. In others it has led to the breaking away or expulsion of dissident, pro-Chinese elements. Until recently, such dissidents would normally have fallen into political oblivion. However, they are now able to turn to the Chinese for assistance and can maintain their existence as separate political centers. Such pro-Chinese political groups now exist in a great number of countries. Where these groups include important party leaders, they are sometimes able to form rival Communist parties. This occurred some time ago in Brazil, and more recently in Belgium, Australia, Paraguay, Ceylon, Switzerland, and Mexico.

20. The Chinese, however, are not the only contenders for influence; the Yugoslavs also play a certain role. Though they are no longer as active as was once the case, the Yugoslavs still exercise some influence on Communist parties and on the leftist non-Communist fringe because their country is an example of an independent Communist state which has developed its own unique "road" of Communist development. Castroism also has influence among the parties; its appeal is most effective among restless Latin American revolutionaries—both Communist and non-Communist—but it also extends to militant groups in other areas (e.g., Zanzibar) where violence is the approved method.

21. Finally there is an assortment of left-wing radicals and revolutionary leaders who, in the early stages of their consolidation of local power, turn to the USSR or perhaps to Communist China for economic and military support. Some work closely with the local Communists, but others avoid or suppress them. They usually proclaim themselves to be vaguely "Marxist," and affirm their commitment to "socialism," their sympathy for the Soviet Union, and antipathy to Western "imperialism." Ben Bella, Lumumba, Nkrumah, Sukarno, and Qasim are examples of the type, which is to be observed mainly in Africa, Latin America, and some parts of Asia. Castro came to power at least ostensibly as a non-Communist revolutionary, but ended by actually taking his country into the Communist camp.

22. Such leaders are by no means reliable instruments of Moscow—not even Castro has become that. Whatever the degree of their dependence on Communist support, they usually insist upon a free hand for themselves domestically, and refuse to submit to control from the Soviet Union or from any other foreign country. Few of them have much understanding of Marxism, or much interest in finer points of doctrine, but they do spread the habit of associating movements of rebellion and protest with Marxist terminology.

23. Such leaders may elevate local, disciplined Communists to positions of influence, and may open the way to an eventual Communist takeover by infiltration. Even when the original leaders, or men like

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them, remain in power, they may have a tendency to constitute themselves hangers-on of the Communist movement without being subject to its discipline, to accept its help without giving it obedience, and sometimes to add their own embellishments to the body of Communist doctrine. This phenomenon presents Moscow with opportunities for expansion of its influence and even for infiltration, but it also carries certain dangers and the risk of sudden setbacks.

#### Western Europe

24. In Western Europe, as a result of general prosperity, most of the Communist parties have to deal with a comparatively affluent and nonmilitant proletariat, and have to devise policies which will enable them to hold influence over the working class and to avoid becoming isolated from political developments within their own countries. The relaxation in East-West tensions has led West European Communist parties to place increasing emphasis on popular front tactics. This turn in events has favored the emergence of a new leadership in the Swedish Communist Party that hopes to move toward a more respectable position in Swedish politics. In France, the party is trying to broaden local electoral alliances with the Socialists into a common front against de Gaulle. In Italy, the party has a long tradition of adapting its policies to local political necessity. However, its long political isolation is now deepened by the Center-Left coalition which may make it also difficult in the longer run for the party to claim that a genuine reform of Italian institutions is impossible without Communist participation.

25. The Communist parties of France and Italy, both by inclination and because of local circumstances, support Soviet views against those of China, especially on the subjects of war and peace and the transition to power. Most of the leaders of the smaller parties have tended to stifle discussion of the issues, lest the dispute stimulate dissidence among the rank-and-file. Especially within the last year, however, pressure has increased greatly on these parties to take a position in the dispute, with the result that dissension has occurred, and some parties have moved to expel leftist militant elements.

#### Sub-Saharan Africa

26. The Republic of South Africa has a long-established Communist Party, which is now illegal and greatly harassed by the police. Despite certain disadvantages arising from the fact that its leadership has been predominantly white, it has infiltrated various nonwhite political movements and it plays a major role among elements resisting the government's policy of *apartheid*. Elsewhere south of the Sahara Communist parties are few and weak; there is indeed no well-developed Communist movement at all. Nevertheless, there are a fair number of Communists, and a small but gradually growing number of revolu-

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tionaries who have undergone training in Communist countries. In Zanzibar a few pro-Communists gained ascendancy in the new revolutionary government, operating in the framework of the Afro-Shirazi Party, whose declared orientation is African nationalist rather than Communist.

27. Most of the new governments of Africa are one-party regimes, or are swiftly evolving in this direction, and it is in this context that the Communists must operate. In some of the French-speaking countries, for example, the generally conservative cast of the regime may nevertheless obscure the presence of fairly radical elements, including probably some genuine Communists, at various levels. That they are indeed present is attested by the events following President Youlou's fall in Congo-Brazzaville. In more left-leaning regimes—such as Ghana—Communists may operate with considerable freedom and achieve a good deal of influence. The "liberation movements" of southern Africa present still a different kind of situation. By their very nature these movements are revolutionary, and in varying degrees all of them are at least potentially susceptible to Communist penetration, if only because of their need for outside support.

28. Sino-Soviet competition has already been evident in Africa, for example in the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, and in rivalry for favor with the Angolan and Mozambique nationalist movements. Chou-En-Lai's recent tour of the area was a striking bid for Chinese influence with some of the governments. The USSR's immeasurably greater material resources give it a considerable advantage, but the appeal of Chinese militancy may still be great, for example to the liberation movements of southern Africa and perhaps to the radical opposition in East Africa.

#### Latin America

29. The strength and operational conditions of the Latin American Parties differ greatly. In some cases—e.g., Chile and Brazil—they favor nonviolent, gradualist tactics as the most promising avenue to power. In others—e.g., Venezuela—the party engages in violence against the regime, in cooperation with pro-Castro elements. As in the rest of the movement, the Latin American parties are affected by the Sino-Soviet dispute. The top leadership of all Latin American parties is pro-Soviet, except possibly in Peru, and most parties have formally associated themselves with Soviet positions. However, factional quarrels have greatly intensified in Ecuador and Peru; in Brazil, Mexico, and Paraguay rival Communist parties exist. In addition, the Latin American parties are subjected to the influence of Castroism, a third element which is neither Sino nor Soviet. Castroism's primary appeal is to the youth and the radical left. Castroist organizations are action-oriented groups which in some cases supplement, and in other cases compete with the Com-

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munist parties. Unlike the Chinese, however, Castro does not seek to take the Communist parties themselves away from Soviet control. A fourth element is composed of a number of small Trotskyite groups which lean toward the Chinese.

#### Far East

30. The Communist parties of the Far East have tended to come under the influence of the Chinese Party, mainly because of China's weight as the dominating power of the area. Most of them operate in fairly backward countries and view China's revolutionary method as appropriate for themselves. Nevertheless, the great variation in circumstances and strengths of the parties has produced a considerable range in the degree of their support for the Chinese position.

31. The Communist Party of Indonesia, with a membership of over two million, now supports China on all the major issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Its feeling of affinity with China as another underdeveloped Asian country is an important factor in this alignment. Support of the Indonesian Government's policies remains the cornerstone of PKI strategy, and all major leaders of the party have stressed that while the possibility of violent revolution must not be overlooked, the PKI hopes to achieve power by other means. Impatience with this policy apparently exists among some party members, but a militant group advocating a change in strategy has not yet gained support of a significant number of the party's members and is not likely to do so in the immediate future.

32. The Japanese Party operates in a highly industrialized environment more akin to Western Europe than to Asia. The party is small and has to compete with a strong Marxist socialist movement. The Japanese Party, though continuing to claim neutrality, now supports the Chinese on all major issues. However, pro-Soviet elements still exert some influence within the party, which still maintains ties with Moscow.

33. In Malaysia, and to a lesser extent Thailand, the Chinese ethnic element in the parties is strong, and the parties have a vested interest in violence; some of China's most loyal support comes from these very small underground parties. Chinese influence is paramount in Burma, but the local movement is rent by factional and personal rivalries. In the parties of Australia and New Zealand, the Chinese have had working in their favor the fact that the parties are small, are sympathetic to Stalinism, and see little or no chance of achieving power except through violent upheaval. In spite of this, however, the Soviets contrived to swing the Australian Party to their side; pro-Chinese elements were expelled and have recently formed a new party. The New Zealand

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Party, on the other hand, has resisted Soviet pressure and has become one of the strongest supporters of the Chinese.

34. The Communist Party of India has had longstanding factional divisions which have been greatly aggravated since policy toward the Government of India has been a major issue in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Opinion within the CPI now is sharply polarized between left and right, but there are distinct subgroups within both factions. A small band of leftist extremists identifies itself with China and agitates for an immediate split in the CPI. The bulk of leftist sentiment, although opposed to cooperation with the bourgeois government, is anti-Soviet rather than pro-Chinese. Its leaders hope to dislodge the present pro-Soviet leadership of the CPI at the Party Congress scheduled for next October. The right-wing leadership, with the support of the Soviets, is attempting to find a basis of cooperation with moderates to keep the party together.

#### Front Organizations

35. The Sino-Soviet dispute has been reflected in Communist international front organizations for several years now, but in the past year the controversy has become more violent. Chinese obstructionist and undermining tactics so far have not threatened Soviet domination of the major front organizations (such as the WPC, WFTU, WFDY, and IUS<sup>4</sup>). However, they have destroyed any pretense of solidarity among Communists, and have increased doubts among non-Communists about the purpose of the organizations. For the Soviets, the effectiveness of most of these front organizations as instruments of propaganda has been damaged. For example, in Japan, Chinese activity has strengthened the pro-Chinese position in Gensuikyo,<sup>5</sup> but has badly damaged the latter as an effective front organization. The Sino-Soviet rivalry is also intense in the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), which is not strictly comparable to the other large Communist front organizations because of the heavy representation it has of nationalist governing parties in Africa.

36. In addition to challenging the Soviets in open meetings, the Chinese are also using the international fronts as forums in which to carry their ideas to African, Asian, and Latin American member groups and leaders. While, at the moment, the Chinese are mainly relying on bilateral contacts to achieve this end, they have also begun to experiment with establishing fronts on their own, such as the Afro-Asian Journalists Organization, with headquarters in Djakarta, in which the Soviets have been relegated to observer status. Peiping

<sup>4</sup> World Peace Council, World Federation of Trade Unions, World Federation of Democratic Youth, and the International Union of Students.

<sup>5</sup> The Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs.

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hopes that, despite Soviet countermoves, it will be able to use such organizations to compete with the Soviet-controlled international fronts in the particular areas where they believe their message is most appropriate and welcome. To the extent that the Chinese are successful, these regional initiatives will put the major fronts on the defensive and seriously challenge their carefully nurtured influence in the underdeveloped areas.

#### IV. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS

37. During the last few years, both the USSR and Communist China have increasingly devoted their attention and energies to combatting each other and competing for allies and adherents. This has necessitated some adjustments in other aspects of their foreign policies. The Chinese challenge almost certainly increases Moscow's current interest in relaxing tensions with the Western powers, though at the same time the Soviets may sometimes feel impelled to a militant policy in underdeveloped areas, lest they be justifiably charged by the Chinese with lack of revolutionary conviction. China, having suffered greatly from the economic sanctions imposed by the USSR since 1960, has already been led to explore different approaches toward some major non-Communist countries, though in this it has emphatically excepted the US. China cannot be sure of either economic or strategic support from the USSR, even should the defense treaty between the two powers remain intact. In general, the aggressiveness of both China and the USSR toward the West, at least in their direct relationships with the major powers, seems bound to be limited in some degree by the new situation in the Communist world. It goes without saying that the activities of Soviet clandestine organizations against the West will not be significantly reduced as a consequence of the rift.

38. The prospects for the Communist movement as a whole are mixed. It has suffered a great setback already; the strength it derived from the claim to be a universal mass movement, to possess a modern scientific ideology, and to be moving toward inevitable worldwide triumph, is seriously undermined. Some of the smaller Communist parties which were nourished largely by this mystique may fade into political insignificance. Those parties which commit their allegiance either to Moscow or to Peiping will be exposed to reprisals, intrigues, and disruptive action by the other side. The result will be that a number of parties will be torn by internal struggle, and much energy will be devoted to attacking and destroying factional rivals.

39. On the other hand, some Communist parties will benefit from the breakup of a disciplined international movement. They will have a wider range of choice in adopting the particular coloration they believe most politically effective in their own national environments. They will have the opportunity to disavow the USSR or China on specific

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occasions, and they may gain a new respectability in their own countries by ceasing to be the mere instruments of a foreign power. In some areas—Western Europe for example—there may be a tendency for groups of Communist parties to develop patterns of common policy and action, distinct from the Moscow or Peiping line, which may be more effective in the area of their primary concern.

40. In general, therefore, we foresee the emergence of a considerable variety of Communists, some chiefly influenced by Moscow or Peiping, some largely autonomous. In some places, Communist parties will tend to lose their elan. In others, they may emerge as more formidable revolutionary organizations than before, though in such cases their aims will probably be more oriented toward their own national circumstances than to the historic worldwide objectives of the international movement.

41. It is important to recognize, moreover, that communism involves other things than a world organization and an intricate doctrine. The techniques of revolution, of party organization, of propaganda, of public control, which the Communists invented or developed, will long be serviceable to any who have the desire and the competence to use them, and Communists will be the most effective teachers of these techniques. Furthermore, communism, whatever its variety or international orientation, will continue to associate itself with some basic impulses common to large sectors of mankind: the urge to rapid change, the demand for social justice, opposition to vested interests of all descriptions. And even though they may on occasion be as hostile to one another as the Chinese and the Soviets now are, Communists will long retain an underlying enmity toward the West, if only because their convictions are in so many respects incompatible with traditional Western concepts of political and economic life.

42. It cannot be convincingly argued, therefore, that the disruption of the unity of international communism is wholly favorable to the interests and security of the US. To be sure, the view generally held through most of the postwar period, that for all practical purposes the world was divided into two camps, is no longer tenable. The unity of the Communist movement has been broken, largely because of the assertion of various and divergent national interests among the new Communist states which came into existence after World War II. The peculiar dangers and difficulties of a bipolar world are tending to disappear. In conducting their relations with Communist states and forming their policies toward revolutionary movements, the principal non-Communist powers will probably find it increasingly advantageous to judge each particular situation on its own merits, rather than on the assumptions which generally prevailed when Moscow unquestionably dominated the international movement.

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43. Yet conflicts of interest between nations, whether Communist or non-Communist, will not cease, and may become more various and conspicuous than before. Revolution, violence, and upheaval will persist, and the likelihood of war at some level may not be appreciably reduced. Communists will continue their advocacy of the class struggle and their support of "wars of national liberation." The ability of Communists, of one or another variety, to take advantage of revolutionary situations may not be significantly reduced; in some instances it will probably increase. The instability of the underdeveloped world may become greater as the alternative revolutionary affiliations open to governments and political groups in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and elsewhere become more numerous. In short, the fragmentation of the world Communist movement is one of the principal developments contributing to the increasing diversity and complexity of the current world situation. It offers new opportunities and advantages to Western policy, but it presents new dangers and difficulties as well.

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