

# GENESIS OF PROPAGANDA AS A STRATEGIC MEANS OF HYBRID WARFARE CONCEPT\*

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We bear witness to the impact that information has on decision-making process, political practice, international relations, as well as the widest public opinion. Manipulation of information and systematic intrusion of social engineering drivers indicate the wide large-scale repercussions in different parts of world, changing the face and dynamics of international relations, governmental structure, political and ethnic contexts, economic and ownership relations. Regarding the analyses of previous academic and scholar literature, those effects could be marked as consequences of implementation of the Hybrid Warfare concept implemented through psychological operations and communication strategies. Content analyses and induction-deduction work intend to provide a baseline for frameanalyses of mass communication usage for achieving the Hybrid Warfare concept aims.

*Key Words: propaganda, mass communication, public relations, hybrid warfare*

## Introduction

The 20<sup>th</sup> century was the age of globalization, technology and communications development, and also the stage of the greatest destruction in previous human history. The First and Second World War, development of the most devastating weapons, ideological, racial and religious clashes, numerous regional highly violent conflicts with millions of victims, food, water and energy caused crises, civil unrest, revolutions, valiance and peaceful or 'colored' changes of regimes, colored global human society as an unsafe and fragile place. The beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century started with more savage influence of interests, and more profiled in the sense of usage of power. Namely, one can notice in international relations, security and defense sphere the avoidance of the destructive and violence – based approach, and more nonviolence, with minimum and selective usage of military power. Moreover, communications management, propaganda, mass media shaping of public opinion and social engineering became more devastating lethal weapons than tanks or rockets. We could agree with the visionary thoughts of Lind

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that „Psychological operations may become a dominant operational and strategic weapon in the forms of media / information intervention ... [and] the main target will be enemy population's support of its government and the war. Television news may become a more powerful operational weapon than armored divisions“.<sup>1</sup> Lind basically announced, by this very concrete vision, the concept which, in our present days, we recognize as hybrid concept of conflict. At the dawn of the new century, globalization could be recognized as the main subject for understanding the relationships on the international scene in time after the Cold War, as well as conditional influence driver for contemporary security challenges.<sup>2</sup> Furthermore, geopolitical environment influenced by globalization became filled with collision of ambitions and interests of out-of-state power centers. Those power groups intend to achieve their interests through soft and hard power instruments of state, international or non-governmental organizations, which potentially lead to conflicts. General characteristics of contemporary conflicts are low intensity and non-specific forms of exposure. In academic and analytical comments, current security threats and risks are frequently termed as hybrid security threats.

## Hybrid security threats and strategic communication

In scope of the influence of globalization on contemporary world security arena, some authors<sup>3</sup> think that the last decade of the twentieth century was committed to a new era of warfare with no limit in terms of assets (armed or unarmed), composition of the deployed forces (national, transnational, multinational, non-governmental), as well as the sphere of attacks (territory, waters, resources, trade, finance, information, media, beliefs, culture, technology, the military, political system). Also, according to some theories,<sup>4</sup> activities that lead to the destabilization of a country or the change of its government with the aim of establishing the state in order to disturb the balance in international relations and execution of its own interests, predominantly by non-combat means, can be termed as *hybrid*.

*Hybrid security threats* include all phenomena, which engage synergistic implementation of conventional weapons, unconventional and irregular tactics, terrorist acts and criminal activities, simultaneously acting on one battlefield with the goal of achieving political objectives.<sup>5</sup> This concept of achieving national interests is called the unconventional, political (hybrid) warfare.<sup>6</sup> Hybrid security threats are generated to establish the conditions, which disrupt the balance of power in international relations and execution of

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<sup>1</sup> Lind, W., Nightengale, K., Schmitt, J., Sutton, J., Wilson, G., (1989). „The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation“, *Marine Corps Gazette*, Oct. 1989, pp. 26.

<sup>2</sup> Mitrović, M., (2017). „Influence of Global Security Environment on Collective Security and Defense Science“, *Temе*, Vol. *XL*, No 3-4 (in print).

<sup>3</sup> Qiao, L., Xiangsui, W., (1999). *Unrestricted Warfare*. PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, Beijing.

<sup>4</sup> Kofman, M., Rojansky, M. (2015). „A Closer look at Russia's „Hybrid War““. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Kennan Cable No. 7, April 2015, pp. 5

<sup>5</sup> Hofman., F.,G., (2007). *Conflict in the 21st Century-The Rise of Hybrid Wars*. Potomac Institute for Policy Studies.

<sup>6</sup> Hoffman., F., G., (2016). *On Not-So-New Warfare: Political Warfare vs. Hybrid Threats*. Retrieved from <http://warontherocks.com/2014/07/on-not-so-new-warfare-political-warfare-vs-hybridthreats/>; 12/05/2017.

its own interests, predominantly by non-combat means.<sup>7</sup> Concepts of non-military usage of national capacities for the purpose of achieving strategic domination are recognized in the US,<sup>8</sup> as well as Russian<sup>9</sup> military doctrinal documents.

Taking into account the characteristics and manifestation of hybrid forms of endangering national security in summary, they could represent the main pillars of hybrid operations expressions:<sup>10</sup>

- Special and psychological operations, which represent the armed, conventional-unconventional forms of the engagement of forces and resources.

- Economic, energy and political pressures. Besides the fact that the economy has intensified as a reflection of the state power, not explicitly the armed forces, it becomes the key subject of military operations planning with the overall military strategy relying on the engagement of various economic instruments, while the classic engagement of the armed forces is projected only when it is absolutely necessary.<sup>11</sup>

- Information campaigns – media and the Internet (ab)use. The essential aim of this pillars is to make an impact on retained public opinion, attitude deviation, changing the existence or adoption of new attitudes, as well as the introduction of doubt, uncertainty and fear. Campaigns are being carried out by the usage of all propaganda instruments, launching half-truths, unchecked sensations, media manipulation, cyberspace attacks, etc. The strong performances of creating public opinion significantly contribute to resultant effects of foreign policy, which aims to achieve the strategic dominance in a particular region.<sup>12</sup>

- Public diplomacy is an activity of low intensity, long-term oriented, directly related to the concept of soft power, based on intangible and indirect influences such as culture, social values and ideology.<sup>13</sup> Also, it is the instrument of communication between professional services, such as diplomats and foreign correspondents, and it is the process of intercultural communication.<sup>14</sup> Public diplomacy is an activity, which deals with the influence of the foreign public attitude in order to formulate and carry out foreign policy applications including international relations beyond traditional diplomacy.<sup>15</sup>

All listed activities have the purpose to destabilize a country or to change political governance in it. They are organized and carried out in order to achieve the strategic interests of outer power centers. The purpose is to establish the condition of balance disruption in international relations, and carry out their own interests, mostly by non-

<sup>7</sup> Kofman, M., Rojansky, M., (2015), pp. 3.

<sup>8</sup> Department of the Army (2008). *Field Manual No. 3-0: Operations*. Washington, DC.

<sup>9</sup> Президент России, Москва, (2014). *Военная доктрина Российской Федерации*. Retrieved from, [http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons\\_doc\\_LAW\\_172989/](http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_172989/).

<sup>10</sup> Mitrović, M. (2017). „The economic and energy aspects of a hybrid threat to national security“. *Vojno delo*, Belgrade, 6/2017.

<sup>11</sup> Taillard, M. (2012). *Economics and modern warfare*. Palgrave MacMillan.

<sup>12</sup> Mitrović, M., (2017). „The potential influence of interest groups on the US Foreign Policy – Case of 'Kosovo'“. *Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene nauke*, No.163 – 164 (in print).

<sup>13</sup> Nye, J., (1990). „The misleading metaphor of decline“. *The Atlantic Monthly*, March 1990.

<sup>14</sup> Cull, N. (2006). *Public Diplomacy Before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase*. Retrieved from <https://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/blog/public-diplomacy-gullion-evolution-phrase>.

<sup>15</sup> Mitrović, M., (2017). „Public Diplomacy in Hybrid Warfare paradigm“, *Vojno delo*, Belgrade, 7/2017.

combat means.<sup>16</sup> On the basis of these theories, it could be concluded that hybrid warfare does not represent warfare *per se*, but a form of a conflict concept in which a wide range of military and non-conventional activities are applied with the purpose to achieve the strategic advantages for applying the entity.<sup>17</sup>

*Strategic communication* represents modern management concept of constant adaptation of interactive communication between different levels and forms of organization of human society for the purpose of achieving the desired relationship and establishing relations between subjects of the process.<sup>18</sup>

Communication is not the activity with purpose by itself. On the contrary, it has been created with the aim to establish certain relations between subjects of the communication process. From this point, communication has to be planned, controlled, corrected and directed, and its goals have to be defined, as well as resources. This type of approach leads to the conclusion that organized communication is a strategic and planned process, whose products are newly built relations among subjects. The established new relations are in accordance with wider strategy goals, as well as many other different changeable factors that influence the communication process. Strategic communication is an interactive relation between exchange and harmonization of messages between subjects that are in the process. Therefore, it is necessary to emphasize the dual character of the communication (sending and receiving messages) process, in which the subject with inventive and innovative approach has the dominant role. In strategic communication planning it is necessary to adopt and implement systematic approach, which consists of:

- Analysis of factors of the communication environment, objective, subjective strengths and weaknesses;
- Strategic planning of the communication process;
- Definition, choice and plan of relative communication strategy.
- Implementation of strategy;
- Evaluation of the results of the application of individual phases of communication strategy, revision and completion;

The planning process of communication strategy contains the following customized key-process elements: 1) Definition of goals; 2) Development of strategy at the level of organization; 3) Selection of the communication strategy adjusted to certain target group/groups; 4) Development and implementation of communication tactics, instruments and tools; 5) Periodical evaluation with estimation of effects and planned elements for correction; In order to have the appropriate process of strategy development, meaningful phases involve the following steps:

- Analysis and understanding of the communication environment, contemporary positions, attitude, cultural, ethic and other values of target groups;

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<sup>16</sup> Mitrović, M., (2017). *Critical National Infrastructure in the scope of Asymmetric Security Threats involved in Hybrid Warfare concept*. In Stojanović, S.,(Eds.) *Strategy and Assiemtry*, Belgrade: Staretgic Researche Institut& MC "Odbrana".

<sup>17</sup> Vračar, M., (2017). „Theoretical-epistemological approach in the study of the ‘Hybrid Warfare’”, *Vojno delo*, Beograd, 7/2017 (in print).

<sup>18</sup> Mitrovic, M., „Lobbying - Managing with Strategy Orientated Communication”(March 28, 2017). Available at SSRN: <https://ssrn.com/abstract=2942002> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2942002>.

- Estimation of communication that includes mutual harmonization of wider circle (long-term strategy, common values, future business, political and other goals) with precise communication strategy;
  - Estimation of all resources for implementation of the strategy, and their spatial and time accessibility. Analysis of potential crisis moments with availability of resources (administrative procedures, absence, time lags of available resources, multiple engagement, etc.);
  - Selection of adequate tactic(s) for implementation of strategic communication, which means creation of adjusted instruments and tools for communication;
  - Time adjusting tactics, determination of control, corrective points and actions, planning crisis scenario for every phase of strategy implementation and possible adjustment.
- Taking into account all of the abovementioned things, we could conclude that strategic communication is a planned, comprehensive activity of organizational entities, whose goal is to achieve successful and efficient interaction with the environment.<sup>19</sup> The conclusion is that strategic communication is a part of the wider organizational strategy. Having in mind the framework of the hybrid warfare concept in which an organization strives to achieve geopolitical, security, economic, political or other objective, we can conclude that communication that is performed by special and psychological operations, media and Internet manipulation, as well as support to economy and public diplomacy has significant contribution for an organization. The most important communication model, which is indicated as powerful hybrid warfare concept, is propaganda. However, what is really propaganda (and what it is not), where are its roots, and how is it implemented in the hybrid warfare concept?

## Propaganda – brief history and roots of modern approach

Maybe the most conceptualized retrospective of propaganda development from the ancient times to the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century was provided by the “father of spin”<sup>20</sup> Edward L. Bernays in the preface to the new edition of his work *Crystallizing Public Opinion*.<sup>21</sup> Namely, Bernays lines up the direct link from Babylon monuments, Solon improved voting rules, Greek oratory and philosophy schools till Roman „*Rumores, vox populi, res publicae*“ as the first systematically developed communication strategies. According to him, the purpose of this communication was to establish the support of the wide public for the ruling class and understanding the necessity of the support of social and civilization values. However, the most significant development from promotion and spread of messages was achieved by the Catholic Church. Namely, the first organized and direct attempt to not just inform and animate, but to influence the mind of non-members and attract them to participate in a (religious) idea was recorded in the first half of the 17<sup>th</sup> century. In fact, in 1622 Pope Gregory XV wrote the document entitled “*Sacrae Congregatio De Propaganda Fide*” for the purpose of organizational and doctrinal missionary work abroad. The institutional approach was developed with further establishment of the College of Propaganda in Rome

<sup>19</sup> Mitrović, M., (2017). *Strategic Lobbying*. LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing.

<sup>20</sup> Tye, L., (1998). *Father of spin-Edward L. Bernays and the birth of public relations*. New York: Crown Publishers.

<sup>21</sup> Bernays, E., (1961). *Crystallizing Public Opinion*. New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation p. iii-lvi.

in 1627 by Pope Urban VIII for the education of the missionary priests. Hence, in later years the word *propaganda* came to be applied by any institution or scheme for propagating a doctrine or system.<sup>22</sup> In the middle of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the term was shaped in present day connotation meaning the „term of reproach to secret associations from the spread of opinion and principles, which are viewed by most governments with horror and aversion“.<sup>23</sup> In further scholar discussions, propaganda was also recognized as an organizational attempt „to spread of religious political or revolutionary principals“.<sup>24</sup>

Propaganda has existed since the dawn of civilization and it has its own history of successes and falls. However, some authors define propaganda as the significantly powerful force since the French Revolution, deeply connected with Robespierre's widely promoted and disseminated contentions that the revolutionary France had the mission to bring the world liberation.<sup>25</sup>

However, we could agree with Harold D. Lasswell that the popular discovery of propaganda was made during the First World War, and that our time is „the Age of Propaganda“.<sup>26</sup>

Some definitions recognize propaganda as:

– „Propaganda is spreading of ideas or attitudes that influence opinions or behavior or bout“.<sup>27</sup>

– „Propaganda is a systematic attempt by an interested individual (or individuals) to control the attitudes of groups of individuals through the use of suggestion and, consequently, to control their actions“.<sup>28</sup>

– „Propaganda is an instrument of total policy, together with diplomacy, economic arrangements and armed forces. Political propaganda is the management of mass communications for power purposes with the aim of economization of material costs of world dominance“.<sup>29</sup>

In order to understand propaganda, a useful standpoint could be the suggestion by Willcox that „Mass society, mass media and shifts in technology each contribute to the structure of modern propaganda and the changes must be seen as part of an ongoing process. In this respect, any definition of propaganda must be equally fluid to apply despite changes in society, unless, that is, one draws distinctions between different forms of propaganda dependent upon the chronological timeframe“.<sup>30</sup> However, as general as possible, it could be said that propaganda is a systematic attempt through mass communication to influence the thinking and thereby the behavior of people in the interest of some in-group.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Smith, P., (1969). *International propaganda*. University of Minnesota.

<sup>23</sup> Brande, T., (1842). *Dictionary of Science, Literature and Art*. Cited in Smith, P., (1969). *International propaganda*. University of Minnesota, p. 5.

<sup>24</sup> Flügel, G., (1847). *Vollständiges English-Deutsches und Deutsch- English Wörterbuch*, Vol.1 Leipzig, 1847. Cited in Smith, P., (1969). *International propaganda*. University of Minnesota, p. 6.

<sup>25</sup> Smith, P., (1969). *International propaganda*. University of Minnesota, p.10.

<sup>26</sup> Harold D. Lasswell, and Blumenstock, D., (2006). *World revolutionary propaganda*, San Francisco: Prelinger library, p. 23.

<sup>27</sup> Powel, J., (1951). *Anatomy of Public Opinion*. New York, p.7

<sup>28</sup> Doob, L., (1935). *Propaganda: its Psychology and Technique*, New York, p.75.

<sup>29</sup> Lasswell, H., (1951). *The Strategy of Soviet Propaganda*. In Daniel Lerner (Ed.), *Propaganda in War and Crisis*. New York, p.27.

<sup>30</sup> Willcox, D., (2005). *Propaganda, the press and conflict: the Gulf War and Kosovo*. Routledge, p. 12.

<sup>31</sup> Smith, P., (1969). *International propaganda*. University of Minnesota, p.12.

For sure, propaganda is a very complex and multidisciplinary form of acting, which is in connotation with sociology, psychology, social psychology, political science, and it is very hard to get one overall definition. However, the common understanding of propaganda indicates that it is the art of influencing, manipulating, controlling, promoting, changing, inducing, securing the acceptance of opinions, attitudes, actions or behavior.

## Roots of contemporary propaganda genesis

The complex nature of propaganda was recognized by scholars since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. It was analyzed from socio-psychological, political-psychological, cognitive aspect, behavior, heritage and biological point of view.

One of the most significant and influential approach to understanding the genesis of mass reaction indicated by propaganda were theories of stereotypes and prejudice as generators of solid based public opinion, which are adequate for manipulation of groups ("crowds") of people.

### Stereotypes

Walter Lippmann was recognized as the father of understanding and developing the structure of stereotypes<sup>32</sup> as one of the main drivers for propaganda. In his work *Public Opinion* Lippmann explains that Freud's study of dreams had helped him formulate his idea of the „pseudo-environment“, although by 1922 he had gone beyond the Freudian individual psychology.<sup>33</sup> Namely, according to Lippmann, the real external environment is too big and complex for direct acquaintance by citizens, which indicates that the public can never fully understand the reality. According to Lippmann, people take as facts not what is, but what they perceive to be facts, a counterfeit of the reality or the „pseudo-environment“. Distorted picture arises not only from emotional factors and ego needs, but also from stereotypes, the image we have of people and things. Namely, we do not see and define. On the contrary, we define first and then see. It is symbolic interactionism, where people act towards objects on the basis of managing what the objectives have for them. These meanings, which are products of social interaction, are modified through interruption by individuals. According to Lippmann, the pseudo-environment determines a great deal of political behavior.<sup>34</sup>

Cooley's theory of „looking-glass self“, by which the sense of personal identity arises from interrelation with others, had strong influence on Lippmann's concept.<sup>35</sup> Also,

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<sup>32</sup> Stereotypes are used as synonym for actions of a printer by which some image of reality is pasted to audience by influence on each individual. See more in Lippmann, W., (1993). *Phantom public*. Transaction Publishers.

<sup>33</sup> Curtis, M., (1998). *Introduction*. In Lippmann, W., *Public Opinion*. New Jersey: Rutgers-The State University New Brunswick, pp. XV.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid*, p. XVI.

<sup>35</sup> Cooley thinks that one cannot understand oneself without reference to one's interpretation of how others see us. He thinks that heritage and social environment influence human behavior and that human nature, in this sense, is subjected to change. According to him, human nature, in any such sense as this, is in the highest degree changeful because the behavior to which it gives rise varies, morally and in every other way with the influences that act upon it. See more in Cooley, C., (1922). *Human Nature and the Social Order*. Charles Scribner's Sons.

Meed's<sup>36</sup> theory of self-concept by which sense of one is a reflection of what an individual believes others think of him<sup>37</sup> had great influence on Lippmann's model.

Basically, Lippmann corresponds to the basis of modern social and psychological thoughts from the scientific and cultural environment of his age including the first two-three decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. According to him, the pseudo environment is representation of the world, which could be true, false or the mixture of two. The response of people depends on cognitive factors and mental construction. Stereotypes used to be certain fixed habits of cognition. Lippmann introduced a strong distinction between „truth“, which is not the import for press (media) and „news“, which is. Namely, the purpose of news is to signal an event; the function of truth is to bring the hidden facts to light, to let them into relation with each other, and to make a picture of the reality on which people can act. Furthermore, Lippmann thinks that news depends on stereotypes, standardization, routine judgment and a disregard for subtlety. Also, he thinks that the pattern of stereotypes at the center of our codes largely determines which group of facts we shall see, and in what light we shall see them. The pseudo environment resulted from censorship, our urge to simplify the complex, and the fear to face facts, which undermines cherished beliefs. He puts under critical consideration the perception of traditional democracy theory and the way in which power is exercised. Namely, the democratic theory assumed citizens could make rational decisions on public issues once they were aware of the facts. According to Lippmann, in the globalized world, knowledge does not need spontaneous management, but rather organized and goal-oriented one. A distortion of the facts is present in the mind of citizens, and each person creates a reality that is felt to be appropriate. Stereotypes, which are used and guarantee our self-respect, the projection of the world of our own sense of our own value and our actions, are a reflection of our projections corresponding to actual facts. Furthermore, in *Phantom public*<sup>38</sup> published in 1925 Lippmann involves criticism of the system of democracy, recognizing the public as being simply balloting machinery, without possibility to understand all complexity of the globalized world. According to him, by balloting the public chooses who will be delegated to interpret and understand the world for them. According to him, democracy supports citizens to ballot the elite, which recognizes national interests and reproduces „real true“ in favor of supporting stereotypes.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Mead, G., (2011). *A Reader*, (Ed.) Carreira da Silva, F., Routledge.

<sup>37</sup> Mead argues that human nature is endowed with and organized by social instincts and impulses, that the consciousness of meaning has arisen through social intercommunication and finally that the ego, the self, that is implied in every act, in every volition, with reference to which our primary judgments of valuation are made, must exist in the social consciousness within which the *socii*, the other selves, is the subject self. Mead follows McDougall's list of eleven human instincts (flight, repulsion, curiosity, pugnacity, subjection, self-display, the parental instinct, the instinct of reproduction, the gregarious instinct, the instinct of acquisition and the instinct of construction) and concludes that six of these are social (pugnacity, subjection, self-display, the parental instinct, the instinct of reproduction and the gregarious instinct) and that such group of instincts inevitably provides the content and the form of a group of social objects. The second implication has to do with the theory of imitation, by which, social instincts imply that certain attitudes and movements of one form are stimuli to other forms to certain types of response. See more in Mead, G., (2011). *A Reader*, (Ed.) Carreira da Silva, F., Routledge, p.14-20.

<sup>38</sup> Lippmann, W., (1993). *Phantom public*. Transaction Publishers.

<sup>39</sup> According to Lippman, ordinary citizens live in the world which they cannot see, do not understand and cannot direct. For that reason, the public needs the elite, decision makers which would be free of trampling and the roar of the bewildered herd. At the core is manipulation and creation of contexts by which the public, incapable of recognizing a wide picture, will be lead. See more in Lippmann, W., (1993). *Phantom public*. Transaction Publishers.

Stereotypes as basic conceptual approach for propaganda setting, following Lippmann's theory, could be recognized as images, categorization or generalization, which emphasizes or exaggerates traits, characteristics or behavior patterns that have been assigned to individuals or groups with a regulatory degree. Individuals in a group would normally be expected to possess the particular characteristics assigned to a group. The traits may refer to the physiological or biological phenomena, or to members of national, ethnic, political, ideological or religious groups. Stereotypes have certain aspects:<sup>40</sup>

– *Sociological* aspect asserts that stereotypes are present in our culture and that we absorb them through the same process of socialization (family, groups, mass media and interaction with others) as we do other concepts or behavior patterns. Of course, stereotypes depend on cultural tradition, group interest and differentiation of the group by outsiders.

– *Psychological* orientation stems from the assumption that stereotypes reflect inner driver, prejudices, or frustrations, and most of it is based on the Freudian literature on the desires of human beings.

– The *Cognitive* approach depends on social reality and context in which we live. The role of the observer is always selective and usually creative because we all have an image of the world we have built. People have only limited capabilities to absorb and process information, so that delegated or elected authorities will choose what is important for feeding the „pictures in our heads“.

The core of the stereotypes concept is that people perceive environment and act on the basis of the perception rather than real environment, and in this process stereotypes are a crucial and functional element. Through categorization and generalization we reduce the complexity and uniqueness of human affairs and relationships to simplicity. In this way, one can get stability and give meaning and predictability. The observer becomes convinced of the validity or perception of a group. One's mental images, perception, beliefs and expectations about a particular individual or group dominate one's outlook on them. In this cognitive process stereotypes may coincide with prejudice in its election accentuation, and interpretation of information about groups. Also, in the cognitive process we have not only re-judgments about things, but also self-fulfilling assertions. We are led to see what we expect to find because of our selective choice of information. We choose to acknowledge information that corresponds with our expectations, and ignore information that does not. The behavior of a group confirms the stereotype we have constructed.<sup>41</sup> The overall conclusion is that Lippmann loved the necessity of manipulation without deep analytical approach to the negative consequences of implementation of the stereotypes concept.<sup>42</sup> In short, stereotypes contribute to economization of opinions by simplifying the process of information selection, which is led by the elected

<sup>40</sup> McClay, W., (1993). *Introduction*. In Lippmann, W., (1993). *Phantom public*. Transaction Publishers, p. xxi-xxv.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*, p. xxvii.

<sup>42</sup> Lippmann coined "a myth is not necessarily false...if it has affected human conduct a long time, it is almost certain to conation much that is profoundly and importantly true". Furthermore, one of the problems in assessment of stereotypes is centrality of the supposed characteristics - ambitious, aggressive, thrifty, and so on-of a group to the other aspects of its behavior. The other problems are the validity of the characteristics themselves in cooperation with the behavior patterns of members of a group, and the degree to which a stereotype is accepted. The future problem arises in the case of the last factor, when some members of a stereotyped group accept the dominant image of themselves and even reinforce it. This has been termed "the mirror-image" attitude. See more in Lippmann, W., (1993). *Phantom public*. Transaction Publishers, p. xxx-xxvi.

elite.<sup>43</sup> The second conclusion introduces stereotypes as self-defense base of their own identity, which is elementary as motivation for the public inner support for action. The elected elite could easily amplify public support for action by self-defense core stereotypes, constricted on the basis of „us against them“ comparison, where „we“ is always a positive identity, and „them“ is negative and evil one.<sup>44</sup>

## Prejudice

Another milestone, which contains the core of propaganda concept together with stereotypes, is prejudice. Conceptualization of prejudice as the driver for influence on generic public attitudes is Gordon W. Allport with his study *The nature of Prejudice*.<sup>45</sup> Allport is the founder of the cognitive approach to prejudice, which views stereotyping and categorization as normal and inevitable by-products of how people think. Yet, he also viewed prejudice as a fundamentally irrational hatred born of ignorance and the ego-defensive maneuvers of people with weak personality structures. Allport's emphasis on antipathy directed the field towards the types of prejudice that produce exclusion and violence. However, it distracted the field from other types of bias involving more subtle types of control and exploitation (e.g. affectionate paternalism). Basically, Allport defines prejudice as „an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization“,<sup>46</sup> and the most of critically based scholars recognize this approach as the main limitation point of view of prejudice as antipathy.<sup>47</sup> Moreover, besides „antipathy“, some authors recognize „faulty generalization“ as the problem in Allport's theory, as well as the possibility of positive prejudice, whose existence depends fundamentally on flexible social context and slowly yields to changes in groups' positioning in the social structure.<sup>48</sup>

Allport also insists on categorization, and according to him „The human mind must think with the aid of categories. . . . Categories are the basis for normal prejudgment“. <sup>49</sup> We cannot possibly avoid this process for at least five reasons:<sup>50</sup>

– *Categories enable people to function in the world.* People cannot possibly treat every person (or object) as unique, and must understand them in terms of prior experiences.

<sup>43</sup> Stereotypes may change in the long run or in accordance with changes in the political climate. Stereotypes in broad sense could serve to an individual (cognitive structuring of the sense of the world) or a group and provide a guide to behavior and conduct towards those individuals and groups. They provide a facile explanation for complex political and social events and they are used as a mechanism for justification of actions and differentiation among groups and people. See more: Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Negative images and attributes of inferior status of some group lead to negative stereotypes creation, which contributes to possible valiance, justification for war, aggression, colonization and civilizing mission or democratization. The emphasis on one's own positive attributes, and stressing the negative information about others, contributes to the collective sentiments that help bind a group together and provide for continuity and solidarity. Ethnocentrism, ideological racism, as well as other „isms“ could be stereotypes, which exaggerate animosity, potential hostile and enemy approach. See more: Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Allport, G. W. (1954/1979). *The nature of prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books.

<sup>46</sup> Allport, G. W. (1954/1979). *The nature of prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, p. 9.

<sup>47</sup> Dovidio, J., Glick, P., and Rudman, L., (2005). *Reflecting on of Prejudice: Fifty Years after Allport*. In (Ed. Dovidio, J., Glick, P., and Rudman, L.,). *On the Nature of Prejudice*. Blackwell Publishing.

<sup>48</sup> Eagly, A. and Diekman, A., (2005). *What is the Problem? Prejudice as an Attitude-in-Context*. In (Ed. Dovidio, J., Glick, P., and Rudman, L.,). *On the Nature of Prejudice*. Blackwell Publishing, p. 19-35.

<sup>49</sup> Allport, G. W. (1954/1979). *The nature of prejudice*. Cambridge, MA: Perseus Books, p. 20.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid, p. 21.

– *Efficient and effective* approach insists that categories gather as much as they feasibly can in their cluster. Gross categories are more pragmatic for many purposes than fine-grained categories. The least effort is the most efficient as long as it can guide interaction with the environment.

– *Categories aid identification*. When one classifies objects or other people one knows what they are. The category links relevant associations and concepts allowing prejudgment. For social groups stereotypes guide perception and interaction with people facilitating speedy adjustments.

– *Categories provide affective tags* with recognizable, simplified and understandable flavor to all their contents with unique ideational and emotional savor, linking it to emotional prejudices.

– *Categorization processes reflect significant irrationality*, which is easy to be formed, modified, consisting of intense emotions, resistant to evidence, admitting and ignoring exceptions.

Basically, with categorization and prejudice Allport contributes to the approach of „economization“ of time, which a person, a member of a group necessarily needs to understand and classify the other group.

## Organization and management of groups

In order to persuade and introduce stereotypes and/or prejudice as drivers for managing public relations process, preconditions are to organize individuals in generic groups with common characters, values, identities, attitudes, etc. In that sense, a group or according to Le Bon „Crowd“ is characterized by „The disappearance of conscious personality and the turning of feelings and thoughts in a definite direction, which are the primary characteristics of a crowd about to become organized, do not always involve the simultaneous presence of a number of individuals on one spot“.<sup>51</sup> Le Bon argues about *psychological law of the mental unity of crowd*, which literally indicates the existence of a psychological crowd, that once constituted, it acquires certain provisional and determinable general characteristics. It means that the crowd's collective mind, once formed, is doubtless transitory, and it represents very clearly defined characteristics of a psychological crowd. Thus, it forms a single being, and it is subjected to the *law of the mental unity of crowds*.<sup>52</sup>

Furthermore, Le Bon thinks that the most striking peculiarity presented by a psychological crowd is the following: 1) Transformation of an individual in the collective mind; 2) Action of the collective mind is different than single one; 3) Crowd stimulates ideas and feelings for self-extraction.<sup>53</sup> Le Bon supports his conclusions by theories of heritage (germ plasm, race) and social development (religion, traditions, time, political and social institutions, instruction and education). General characteristics of crowds are:<sup>54</sup>

– *Impulsiveness, mobility, and irritability of crowds*. The crowd depends on all exterior exciting causes, and it reflects their incessant variations. The impulses, which the crowd obeys, are strongly domineering in order to overwhelm the feeling of personal interest. Premeditation

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<sup>51</sup> Le Bon, G., (2002). *The Crowd*. New York: Dover publications, p. 2.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, p. 3.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid, p. 4.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, p. 10-42.

is absent from crowds, but there is racial influence. *Crowds are credulous and readily influenced by suggestion.* Dominant obedience of crowds to suggestions is related to the fact that images, which are evoked in the mind of crowds, are accepted as undoubted realities. Education of individuals in a crowd does not have an impact on the sense of influence of illusions, by which a crowd could equally consist of the educated and ignorant men.

– *The exaggeration and ingenuousness of the sentiments of crowds.* Crowds do not admit doubt or uncertainty, and they always go to excesses. Their sentiments are always extreme.

– *The intolerance, dictatorialness, and conservatism of crowds.* A crowd is intolerant of any sign of differences, and it generates its unity on the uniqueness. The momentary revolutionary instincts of crowds do not prevent them from being extremely conservative because crowds are instinctively hostile to changes and progress.

– *The morality of crowds.* The morality of crowds, according to the suggestions under which they act, may be much lower or much higher than that of the individuals composing them and it could be remarked among the special characteristics of crowds. Acting characteristics of a crowd are impulsiveness, irritability, incapacity to reason, absence of judgment and the critical spirit, exaggeration of sentiments, etc.<sup>55</sup>

The factors, which determine these opinions and beliefs, are of two kinds:

– *Remote factors* are those which render crowds capable of adopting certain convictions and absolutely refractory to the acceptance of others. These factors prepare the ground in which certain new ideas are suddenly seen to germinate, whose force and consequences are the cause of astonishment, though they are only spontaneous in their appearance. The outburst and putting certain ideas in practice among crowds present at times startling suddenness. This is only a superficial effect, behind which a preliminary and preparatory action of long duration must be sought. Remote factors are: 1) Race; 2) Traditions; 3) Time; 4) Political and Social Institutions; 5) Instruction and Education.<sup>56</sup>

– *Immediate factors* are those which, coming on the top of this long, preparatory work, in whose absence they would remain without effect, serve as the source of active persuasion on crowds; in other words, they are the factors, which cause the idea to take shape and let loose with all its consequences. The resolutions by which collectivities are suddenly carried away arise out of these immediate factors; due to them a riot breaks out or a strike is decided upon, and enormous majorities invest a man with power to overthrow a government. Immediate factors are: 1) Images, words, and formulae; 2) Illusions; 3) Experience; 4) Reason.<sup>57</sup>

Consequently following Le Bon's theory of crowds, it is possible to introduce Huxley's debate about unconsciousness of individuals that in modern society, under the pressure of quantity, quality, morality and organization of society, people are pushed into crowds. Namely, in modern world „millions of abnormally normal people, living without fuss in a society to which, if they were fully human beings, they ought not to be adjusted, still cherish 'the illusion of individuality', but in fact they have been to a great extent deindividualized“.<sup>58</sup> According to Huxley, every society attends to standardize the human individual on purpose

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<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> See more: Ibid, pp. 46-60.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid, p. 60-71.

<sup>58</sup> Huxley, A., (1958/2000). *Brave New World Revisited. (El. edition)*. New York: Rosetta Books, p. 20.

by using some dogmas. The main reasons for this are overpopulation and over-organization of modern world, which indicates the necessity for democratic institutions to work effectively. According to Huxley, modern institutions use propaganda to deliver the necessary efficiency, and in that process we could recognize „rational propaganda, in favor of action that is consonant with the enlightened self-interest of those who make it and those to whom it is addressed, and non-rational propaganda that is not consonant with anybody's enlightened self-interest, but is dictated by, and appeals to, passion“.<sup>59</sup>

When it comes to the actions of individuals, there are more exalted motives than enlightened self-interest. However, where a collective action has to be taken in the fields of politics and economics, enlightened self-interest is probably the highest of effective motives. Huxley argues that „Propaganda in favor of action dictated by the impulses that are below self-interest offers false, garbled or incomplete evidence, avoids logical argument and seeks to influence its victims by the mere repetition of catchwords, by the furious denunciation of foreign or domestic scapegoats, and by cunningly associating the lowest passions with the highest ideals, so that atrocities come to be perpetrated in the name of God and the most cynical kind of *Realpolitik* is treated as a matter of religious principle and patriotic duty“.<sup>60</sup> According to him, the main tools that support propaganda in modern world are media, which are under the control of the Power Elite in society. The constitution of the Power Elite depends on organization of society and ownership under media. A person in modern era makes direct contact with society and reality in two ways: as a member of some familial, professional or religious group, or as a member of a crowd. Therefore, shaping public opinion of the masses is led by several principles: value judgment, focusing, reaction by feelings and unconscious drives. Successful propaganda is virtuous in manipulating instincts and emotions, in the form of constantly repeated stereotyped formulas.<sup>61</sup>

For Huxley, people are more convicted to the irrational propaganda that makes it the most influential. According to him „[T]he principles underlying this kind of (irrational) propaganda are extremely simple. Find some common desire, some widespread unconscious fear or anxiety; think out some way to relate this wish or fear to the product you have to sell; then build a bridge of verbal or pictorial symbols over which your customer can pass from fact to compensatory dream, and from the dream to the illusion that your product, when purchased, will make the dream come true“.<sup>62</sup>

## Conclusion

On the basis of the abovementioned analyses, the conclusion could be affected in line with identifying the process of propaganda: the Existence of the Power Elite, which consumes the delegated and elected by people right to estimate priorities and image of the reality; the Power Elite aspires to efficiency, prioritization and economization of the masses by using the focus - based stereotypes and prejudice in forms of rational and

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid, p. 28.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, p. 29.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, p. 33-38.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid, p. 42.

irrational messages broadcasting; Messages could be addressed to any audience, group, nation, and they have purpose to achieve aims of the Power Elite. In the core of propaganda we have recognized stereotypes, prejudice and mass manipulation modeling. Considering stereotypes and theory of prejudice, one group, even the whole nation, could be directed to some other group or nation by active communication campaign provided by the elected elite, or interest groups, which are considered as the unique elite.

In context of the Hybrid Warfare concept, propaganda as previously considered, could be recognized as a part of all offered pillars: special and PSYOPS, economy and energy, media and Internet, and public diplomacy. For sure, in some pillars propaganda is the tool of acceleration and it supports the desired effects (special operations, economy, public diplomacy). However, in some of them it has its own agenda (PSYOPS, media, Internet). Furthermore, propaganda as an instrument of strategic communication for the purpose of achieving hybrid aims, is used in the preparation phase (creation of stereotypes and prejudice) and in the phase of action (motivation for action, readiness to fight, insensibility for „their“ victims, generalization of „our“ achievements as undoubted right, etc.).

Of course, propaganda is essential for dissemination and support of all activities and achievements in the sphere of recognized pillars of the hybrid warfare concept. Globalized contemporary security environment does not recognize absolutely safe country, which means that a threat to national security is „clear and present“ danger, especially in the hybrid warfare conceptual meaning. This indicates that every country has to adopt critical and rational approach to the existence of hybrid security threats. In favor of this, active propaganda activities should be recognized as a signal of interest and current presence of interest of some side to achieve hybrid strategy dominance and goals. As a possible answer to propaganda activities, some strategically planned activities could be performed:

– *Identification of sources*, by which it is possible to identify motives of a subject, who has performed an action.<sup>63</sup> Namely, identification of initiators and their motives could provide real ambitions and aims of hybrid operations and clarify environmental situation, as well as the position of other stakeholders.

– *Recognition of core values*, which are constituent factors of stereotypes and prejudice genesis upon which counterpart propaganda builds antagonism, regards our side in its and other exposed public. Also, it could provide understanding of motivation for an action and the level of negative implication for our side and the root of antagonistic image of „us and them“.

– *Identification of main communication channels*, by which it is possible to understand who is message for, is mostly dedicated, or which segment of public is most valuable for sender. Although the modern global media have almost the unlimited possibility to reach every person on the Earth, dedicated professional analyses could recognize the main segment of public, as well as the main message. This could provide recognition of weakness spot in campaign, „blind“ spots of uncovered public, as well as the open space for defense propaganda actions.

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<sup>63</sup> Nikolić, N., „Elaboration of novelty of the Hybrid Warfare concept“. *Vojno delo*, 5/2017.

– *Mobilizing interest - based coalition*, by which we could develop capabilities for counterpropaganda efforts. Coalition and allies should be based on interest, rationality and mutual aims. Otherwise, non-principal coalition, where one side has hidden agenda of their own actions, again places our side in a victimized position. Trust and honesty could be marked in propaganda reciprocity. In case of in-reciprocity, the consequences could be the loss of its own identity and becoming a sort of „trolling nation“.

– Development *and implementation of counterpropaganda strategy*, which means the development of strategic communication campaign and its implementation. In the strategy development all necessary postulates of strategic management should be involved, otherwise, the campaign will probably fail.

Finally, propaganda is not a new phenomenon. However, in contemporary environment it has acquired new power on the basis of previous theoretical concept and wide experience. For sure, propaganda, as well as the executed deception operations, has been the powerful tool of generals, intelligence agents and politicians throughout history. However, in contemporary security environment it has gained a large role and significant importance mainly due to highly technically advanced and globalized international political environment.

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