

PACIFISM AND MORAL INTEGRITY¹

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Abstract

The paper has three parts. The first is a discussion of the values as goals and means. This is a known Moorean distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values, with one other Moorean item – the doctrine of value wholes. According to this doctrine the value wholes are not simply a summation of their parts, which implies a possibility that two evils might be better than one (e. g. crime + punishment, two evils, are better than either one of them taken separately). In this first part I will discuss peace as an end value, and war as a means value.

The second part discusses briefly the issue of sincerity.

The third, last and for me the most important part of the paper explores the issue of moral integrity in pacifism: could a pacifist preserve the integrity of the attacker, or, for that matter her own integrity, or must she destroy anyone's integrity and dehumanize the attacker and also herself?

Keywords Pacifism., Defense , Violence , Self-defense , Moral integrity , Moral arrogance.

I. Values as goals and means

While it is true, as William James² noted, that peoples, nations, and even mankind as a whole acquired much of their identity through perils, glory and agony of the wars

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² Cf. W. James, "The Moral Equivalent of War", R. Wasserstrom, *War and Morality*, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Inc., Belmont, CA, 1970, p. 4.

they fought, it is the value of peace that gives wars their true meaning. War itself is never the final end; it only has instrumental value. By contrast, peace is valuable in itself, and is always among the final goals of any war. This is why it is only *prima facie* paradoxical that Gods of war had always occupied higher social standing than Gods of peace: this just further confirms Kant's thesis that to will an end is to will the necessary means for achieving this end.³ This also points to the fact that the means are what is within our power (our current political control), while we can get to exercise control over our ends only by achieving them first, i.e., we control our ends only *via* the means (if at all). But this asymmetry between the intrinsic value of peace and the instrumental value of war notwithstanding, when it comes to evaluating them as states of affairs we will have only one evaluative procedure, and this is what leads to the drastic discordance between value determinations for these states of affairs. On one side, there is a possible effective and well defined instrumental value of the war, e. g. in defence, and on the other side it is possible to regard war to such a degree intrinsically evil that it may appear that war in itself is *always* impermissible (regardless of its instrumental value).

This is the place wherein lies that attitude towards war according to which only its *per se* value matters, and its instrumental value is regarded as entirely unimportant or at least nowhere nearly as important as its value in isolation.

The limiting case of this attitude towards war, the attitude according to which the only thing that matters is its separate, negative value while its instrumental value is of no consequence at all--which also renders insignificant those ends for which war is the means--may be called pacifism.

This may appear to be a solid political viewpoint, which in the arena of existing political positions could attempt to compete and impose its own standard for what is most

³ Cf. I. Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, 4:417.

important in that which is "good". However, this position fails to satisfy the requirements of consistency: If *any* degree of relevance to the instrumental value of war is acknowledged, one is thereby admitting that the separate values of those ends for which war is a means may be weighed against the distinguishing (negative) value of war, and even overshadow it (i. e. become more important). This would, then, be the end of exclusionary stand of pacifism. Therefore, instrumental value of the war cannot be allowed to get on the table.

Consequently, one could not count on the separate value of war to consistently prevail over its instrumental value (since to compare them presupposes applying one and the same criterion to make them comparable in the first place). This would call into question the rationale for devising a separate evaluative standpoint on this matter. For, as soon as the maximalist requirement of absolute prohibition of war is given up--which happens the moment any relevance is accorded to the instrumental value of war --what will figure in the evaluation of war is just its instrumental value. Its separate value will only play a secondary role, always in the context of some of its possible instrumental values, it will just figure as an additional but pre-calculated, i.e. presupposed, burden to it. This presupposition is there before and independently of any instrumental value of war, and it becomes a part of this value as one of its parameters, but in the end it is this instrumental value that is the object of evaluation. The specific/separate value of war isn't intrinsic, it does not as such determine some positive goal, nor does it provide a description of some state as a goal. The specific/separate value of war only points to the fact that war, aside from those goals for which it is a means, will in every case produce numerous *other, mainly bad, effects*⁴ which in fact determines it as a state. Namely, it cannot be denied that war is an exceedingly evil state of affairs and that therefore its

⁴ Mainly, or almost all of them – but not necessarily all: it is possible to conceive, and it really happens, that such critical conditions like war might also produce good by-products, as Kant would say: Kant, 8:363.

separate negative value must never be overlooked, even when one is taking into account those final ends for which war is a (good, necessary, or efficient) means. However, this sort of evaluation requires no special evaluative standpoint; ordinary moral conscience and minimal intellectual honesty will suffice.

On the other hand, approaching our objects of evaluation from the perspective of some specific evaluative standpoint may, in principle, devalue or negate the significance of entire sets of reasons for, or corroborating explanations of, those items. It also may augment the importance of, or even accord exclusive significance to, some other narrowly defined set of reasons or explanations, thus incorporating an evaluative endorsement into the very judgment of their reasonableness or explanatory power. Such evaluative standpoint, then, disqualifies or devalues in advance some reasons, or explanations, invalidating their reasonableness or explanatory power whenever they are not functioning to the advantage of this very evaluative stance. The conclusion this leads to is that the negative (or positive) intrinsic value of some activity, as a state of affairs, is precisely what prevents it from having a positive (or negative) instrumental value. If something has a certain intrinsic value then, by this determination, it cannot have an instrumental value of the opposite nature. Something that is “good” cannot lead to anything bad or wrong, and something that is “bad” or “wrong” cannot be instrumental in effectuating anything which is per se good or right. In essence, this leads to the doctrine of two causal chains, dualism, a Manichaeism, which should preclude the very possibility of meeting good and evil: the good and evil cannot be parts or ingredients in the same value whole as the good and evil are ontologically necessarily separated⁵. The result is that “bad means” cannot lead to a “good end”, but not in the sense that “bad means” are bad as a means, i. e. ineffective and not instrumental, but in the sense that its intrinsic

⁵ Cf. Max Weber, “Politics as Vocation”, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, tr. & ed. By H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, Oxford University Press (A Galaxy Book), New York 1958, p. 122.

axiological value *forbids* its usage as a means for any end of the opposite pole. Essentially, this is how pacifism gets adopted, even though its endorsement may appear unusual and unexpected: by way of classifying in advance all of the reasons (included among these reasons are their a priori cardinal values) that could emerge, as either positive or negative. What is precluded is the need for any subsequent deliberation about their reasonableness or real explanatory power, thus creating the effect of appearance of obligation, not unlike the one that is truly constituted, e.g., in the context of a promise. In order to make this effect appear well founded, in its aspiration to really ground an obligation, pacifism is characterized as a moral doctrine. Pacifism must present itself in this way not only because the nature of the conceived obligation requires it, but also because of the character of values that would have to be excluded and set aside by virtue of this obligation. In the first place, these are the values of the right to defense.

II. *Sincerity*

The act of adopting the pacifist standpoint with *full sincerity* is in need of serious philosophical analysis. This need is independent of the version of pacifism at issue. For, clearly *no action* based on this standpoint could ever be reduced to a mere *tactic* for achieving some goal, since this would be in contradiction to the pacifist's whole-hearted espousal of pacifism. In the mind of the pacifist, the sincerity with which he adopts pacifism provides the appearance that the pacifist attitude has universal moral grounding. Whether this is just an appearance or a matter of true universality remains for philosophical analysis to uncover. I shall offer some reasons why we should think that pacifism isn't grounded in an universal moral principle, but that it amounts to a particular *Weltanschauung* of the agent. The specific function of this world-view is in fact to

present the state of sincere belief in pacifism as an indication that it must have a secure moral ground. Hence, sincerity is what bridges the gap between what is just a private world-view and alleged universal moral validity of pacifism. Should we agree that pacifism is a private standpoint, then, instead of a moral demand, we would have a mere imposition of this private stand to others, even a pretension of inducing all others to follow it. Indeed, the pacifist attitudes towards violence have more in common with sentiments regarding revenge and forgiveness, than a universal moral principle. Revenge and forgiveness, as private attitudes, are themselves based on disinterested, sincere beliefs of the agent, sincerity being a constitutive condition for them to take place (insincere revenge or insincere forgiveness are not really revenge or forgiveness, but something else). Having distinguished here between private and moral standpoints, we must note that they require different types of justification.

The pacifist takes violence to be an evil of such great magnitude that one ought not engage in violent acts even when such acts are necessary for defense. Giving up defense isn't simply permissible, but it is obligatory. Is this position really morally defensible? What does it mean to give up defense on moral ground?

The following consideration shows that while the phrase "giving up self-defense" may have meaning, it cannot be justified on moral grounds. One's decision to give up defense in some concrete situation, when an attack is under way, may have different causes. In some cases they even have no semblance of principled decisions. For example, when the cause is fear or ignorance. It could, instead, be one's judgment or conviction that the indication of intent to refrain from defense may have such an effect on the aggressor that it would prevent or halt his attack. Giving up self-defense may in fact

sometimes be the best defense. But could such behaviour properly be called "pacifist"? One's judgement on what constitutes the best tactic in any given case may turn out to be fallacious, and thus, contrary to what was intended, encourage the aggressor. How would this affect one's ability to judge in similar future situations? Obviously, this sort of decision-making, however successful, has no underlying principle, and thus pacifism could play no constitutive role in it given its claim to universal moral validity.

Let us now consider the decision *never* to engage in self-defense. This is, in fact, a principled decision. But is it based on a *moral* principle? If it were, so would be my decision to radically eradicate all my vices, for example never smoke or gamble? Similarly, I could decide to fast every Wednesday, or become vegetarian. Suppose I strictly follow all these decisions. This would be insufficient to show that they have moral justification, and even the term "principled" is restricted to the level of decision-making, not to its exercise: I cannot *prove* that a decision is "principled" by the *fact* that I systematically follow it. Normative and factual levels are independent.

Strictly following a decision does not produce a moral demand. If it did, then one could legitimately demand that all others follow any such "principled" decisions.⁶ The appearance of universal validity such decisions have is completely dependent on one's power to continuously live up to its demands. Of course, this power is entirely a matter of contingency, and, unlike universalization, is not the sort of thing applicable to all members of the moral community who may find themselves in sufficiently similar circumstances. By contrast, one who opts for consistent truth-telling or promise-keeping fares much better regarding the universalizability of his choices. Now, the pacifist demand to give up self-defense is clearly unlike the latter case, but not dissimilar to the former examples concerning decisions to fast on Wednesdays, become vegetarian, or

⁶ Some of these arguments are well analyzed in Jan Narveson's "Pacifism", *Ethics* 75 (1964/5), 4, reprinted in many collections.

eradicate vices. For this reason I have no right to expect, even less to demand, of all others to universally reject self-defense based on the fact that *I* decided to refrain from engaging in acts of self-defense. Decisions like these (even when universally followed) are just a kind of pledge, a form of promise-making or a vow to oneself. Once a commitment of this sort is made perhaps there is an obligation to fulfill it, but it does not follow from this that the choice to make such commitment had to be made.

We may want to ask here whether acting in accordance to pacifist demands might be seen as acts of supererogation? Supererogatory acts may not be universally required, since they go beyond the call of duty, and they possess their value only as individual acts. For this reason it is morally impermissible to designate in advance any agents, individually or as a group, with the obligation to perform such acts. Imagine a case of *heroic brotherhood*, whose member one becomes by giving an oath to perform heroic deeds! However admirable the acts of these people may be, their prior decision that these must be heroic acts is what devalues them. In fact, it is unclear whether what they do can properly be deemed heroic. Similarly the decision never to engage in self-defense, contrary to what the pacifist thinks, is far from having any clear worth. Therefore, the power to consistently perform according to one's prior decision is not the road to moral value.

III. *The argument from integrity*

The central feature of pacifism is the prohibition of killing in self-defense.⁷ The reasoning goes along the following lines: from the assumed absolute value of life the pacifist concludes that the prohibition against killing also implies the prohibition against

⁷ Cf. R. Norman, "The Case for Pacifism", *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, Vol. 5, no. 2, 1988, p. 198.

killing in self-defense. What kind of right could fare with this position? It is a conception of a right based on a maximalist interpretation of the idea of freedom, the so called "positive freedom," within which possibility and actuality coincide entirely.⁸ Such interpretation of rights faces serious conceptual problems, and they further give rise to corresponding normative problems. One of those problems is of particular interest to us here: this strong notion of a right implies the thesis that everything with practical import equally concerns all people, and thus others are equally concerned with my rights as I am myself. The realization of some right isn't simply expected or demanded - with good reason - but it is understood as a granted fact. Therefore, a failure of this realization is never a result of competition with the rights of others, nor could the disinterestedness of others play a role here, but it can only be a result of objective obstacles or ignorance. In the context of pacifism, the right in question is the right to life and its realization. The realization of the right to life conceived as an absolute value is understood as given, hence the threat to this right can only be a result of a disaster. In fact, the right to life, in its capacity as a right, according to this maximalist interpretation of rights, cannot even be threatened. The defense is unnecessary because it is impossible, and it is impossible because it is irrelevant: the value under attack is beyond the reach of the aggressor. Life as a biological fact isn't what is at issue here, but instead life as a value, which is based or supervenes on this fact. The aggressor, in the morally relevant sense, cannot then in any way place this value in danger, and hence the aggression is in advance doomed to failure.

This attitude, that harm and offence are beyond the reach of the aggressor, is admittedly a very strong moral standpoint. The argument that St. Augustine offers against

⁸ On the "positive" freedom see Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty", in I. Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty*, Oxford University Press 1969.

suicide is similar to this.⁹ Roughly, in the case of rape, the argument goes, suicide is not the way to salvage one's honor which is presumably damaged by rape.

This is not because dignity and honor are irrevocably and totally lost, but rather because, if the victim herself did not "partake" in the process that caused her harm, her honor wasn't harmed in the first place; that sort of harm is entirely outside of the attacker's reach. The aggressor may harm his victim's physical integrity, but not her spiritual integrity. Thus, the attempt to safeguard the latter through suicide only indicates that she herself isn't clear with what her contribution was, which has no bearing on where she stands with respect to her attacker. For this is simply an external relation to her; innocence cannot be lost through rape nor demonstrated through suicide. Similarly, the pacifist may hold that the attacker *de facto* can do no harm to him--he can only kill him, torture him, restrict his freedom, etc., but he cannot humiliate him, unless the attacker achieves this through some sort of collaboration on the part of the victim; self-defense may be perceived as such a form of collaboration.

The crucial question here is this: What exactly does the thesis that the aggressor can do no harm to his victim amount to? What *can* he do, if by killing, torture, or restriction of freedom he can achieve nothing? Questions like these may appear to be difficult ones. We should look for answers by focusing on the specific meaning of the term "humiliation." Consider the following list of events, call it the A-list: a person is killed by thunder, another seriously wounded by falling over rough-surfaced rocks and experiences tremendous pain, and the third one is stranded on a patch of dry land by flood and has his freedom of movement drastically restricted. Admittedly, any one of these events represents serious misfortune. However, in none of these cases has one suffered the kind of humiliation that can only be a result of being intentionally treated as a mere thing, as when one is murdered, tortured, imprisoned, or enslaved. Call this latter list of events the B-list. Since the B-list is made of examples of what happens as a result of someone's free, intentional action, they have moral significance that events in nature, the A-list examples, cannot have. Consequently, A-list cases, unlike B-list, have no room for responsibility and guilt or blame.

⁹ See A. Augustin, *The City of God*, Bk. I. Ch. 19.

If we now ask again for the meaning of the thesis that the aggressor can do no harm to his victim, we can see the opportunity to interpret pacifism as a claim that fundamental moral values cannot be threatened without the victim's "acquiescence" (which would be produced by her belief that attack is a reason for defense) If so, we have a clear case where the aggressor can do no harm to the victim. If the fundamental moral values - of dignity and moral integrity - are defined in terms of collaboration with the aggressor (which for the pacifist includes everything beyond treating the aggressor as if he's a brute force of nature), then those values really remain outside the attacker's reach. Sincerity here is of crucial importance, but not necessarily in its primary sense--strength of conviction. Rather, we must focus on a different feature of sincerity. The attack itself must be sincerely viewed as entirely morally irrelevant. Only in this way does pacifism avoid being reduced to some form of possible but uncertain defense, only then can the pacifist coherently insist that an attack is no reason for a response, even if this is made more precise in terms of the formulation that "attack is no reason to respond with force." For, the upholders of pacifism have no way to exclude "force" from the inventory of various ways available when one chooses to respond to an attack.

If the questions of whether one should respond to attack and what the nature of the response should be are articulated in the context of a given circumstance, and cannot be determined in advance – then the response, if any, must be dictated by the features of the concrete situation. Therefore, to remain consistent, pacifists must refuse to use pacifism as a defensive strategy. To characterize their position as a defensive tactic they must concede these changes their doctrine to the point of being unrecognizable as a pacifist one. And, of course, they would have to recognize that as with any other tactic in some circumstances their tactical pacifism would have to give way to some other tactic more fitting to the circumstances.

Consistency, then, requires that the pacifist must give up all defenses as such. Sincerity's crucial importance in this context thus becomes clear: the pacifist's principled rejection of self-defense must be independent of specific features of any empirical situation, exercised with conviction, determination, and full confidence that one has made the right decision. However, a necessary condition for accomplishing this is to declare aggression as such altogether irrelevant. Hence, if upon an actual attack one still ponders

about the appropriateness of available tactical responses, such a person cannot properly be regarded as a pacifist. Even if one in the end chooses to do absolutely nothing, as demanded by pacifism, one would still fail to qualify as a pacifist. In order to regard as meaningful the pacifist claim that aggression is irrelevant, we would have to eliminate an important distinction where one clearly exists. The irrelevance of aggression in shaping appropriate response requires that all distinction between the events on our A-list and B-list be erased. There would have to be no moral or conceptual distinction between thunder, accident, or flood on the one hand and killing, torture, or enslavement on the other.

Whatever the moral consequence of blurring this distinction is, a bigger problem for pacifism as a doctrine or a position is that this leads straight to contradiction. If there is no difference captured by the contrast between the A-list and the B-list, then the pacifist's *moral* recommendation against counterattack would treat the aggressor as *both* merely a brute natural force and as a moral agent worthy of respect. Nothing can be both.

The aggressor, therefore, should not be owed the respect that accountability implies. If agents are to be held answerable for their actions, whether meritorious or blameworthy, then the requisite moral judgments are not simply a matter of the right to judge, but also of a duty to judge according to *the* moral criterion. Abandoning this criterion while insisting on the right to pass "moral" judgment would mean that the actual criterion combined with this alleged right can be about anything. Hence aggression could be judged as elegant, effective, impressive, beautifully executed, politically justified, illegitimate, unmotivated, futile, etc. The pacifist however does not want any of this. Instead he insists on renunciation of the use of force as principally prohibited in the way that only morality can afford because he strives to express contempt for his attacker by declaring that whatever the aggressors actions are, they do not matter. As an unaccountable, brute force, not unlike an avalanche or hurricane, the aggressor never raises to the level of being even a candidate for moral blame as far as the pacifist's untouchable moral integrity is concerned.

With his contempt for the aggressor the pacifist finds himself in the middle of an absurd dialectic that leads straight to moral nihilism. Were he to be successful in declaring the aggression irrelevant the pacifist would also render as irrelevant everything

that is under attack. The pacifist's contempt reduces the aggressor to an unaccountable blind force of nature, but by the same token denies him any respect. This precludes moral evaluation of the aggressor's actions, since universal respect is a presupposition for all moral evaluation. Furthermore, respecting the distinction between acts and events is a universal moral duty. Attributing actions to their agents and distinguishing them from mere events in nature is not simply a conceptual matter but is of utmost practical importance if moral evaluation as such is to be even possible.

However, the universal respect isn't simply a presupposition for moral judgment; it is also an object of a universal moral duty, duty to ascribe actions--as evidence of moral agency which, therefore, isn't just simply distinguishable from mere events in nature, but in virtue of this difference becomes a necessary object of moral evaluation--to corresponding agents who find themselves accountable for what they do. We have the right to judge them precisely on the basis of this presupposition of accountability, which we may ascribe to them only if we do not treat them as blind forces of nature--that is, if we have respect for them. Without the normative presupposition about the necessity of universal respect, there would be no universal right to moral judgment. What is more, without this normative presumption it wouldn't be impossible for an agent to claim exemption from the moral criterion, and insist that any application of this criterion to his actions represents a violation of his right to be exempt in this way. And if we could exempt others from the moral criterion, then they could do the same for themselves. Or, we can do the same for ourselves, even for the purpose of saving our purity, purity of our souls, by exempting ourselves from the universal obligation to respect others – and ourselves. This amounts to an attempt to make our salvation necessary by eliminating ourselves as objects of moral evaluation, through sincere avoidance of any temptation to participate in violence.

Respect, if it exists, is always universal respect because respect is a reflexive relation. Respect differs in this way from other "sentiments," such as love, which may be discriminatory – e.g. I may love others without loving myself (and *vice versa*). Respect and self-respect, by contrast, presuppose each other. Hence, with his contempt for the attacker the pacifist also devalues himself. By taking the authority in his hands to deny others the minimum respect necessary for moral appraisal of their actions, the pacifist

exhibits the kind of arrogance that directly negates the universal nature of respect. Thus, ipso facto, he excludes himself from the domain of those who are owed respect, and proves himself incapable of self-respect. But without self-respect he has no right to have contempt for others. He reduces his own self to the level of a mere thing, and his actions to mere events in nature. Moreover, by doing so he presents himself as the accomplice in the aggression. Since aggression, by definition, represents a violation of moral rule grounded in universal respect for autonomous agency, through his self-reification the pacifist only contributes to the offense and adds to the immoral elements already present in the act of aggression. On the level of human action the pacifist is simply joining forces with the stronger side. He not only capitulates before the aggressor, he ends up making a contribution to the aggressor's success. His contribution is exposed in the confirmation, rather than a denial, of the attack. By deciding a priori that the aggressor represents the stronger side the pacifist is guilty of a fallacy that confuses empirical questions with conceptual ones.

In my interpretation, the pacifist's position is analogous to the one of Lucretia, who attempted to prove her virginity by committing suicide, as discussed by Augustin. Both attempts are inadequate. Just as suicide does not prove one's virginity, forgoing defense does not establish or protect moral integrity.¹⁰ If Lucretia had been in the position

¹⁰ The concept of integrity has been used here only implicitly. It should be further explored and defined more explicitly. Being one of the most important and most difficult to explain notions in moral philosophy, it certainly deserves independent elaboration. The way it has been used here is, I believe, not unlike the one of Bernard Williams in "A Critique of utilitarianism", in Smart & Williams, *Utilitarianism: For and Against* (Cambridge University Press 1973, pp. 99ff). It pointed to the distinction between negative and positive responsibility (*negative* responsibility for one's own decisions and projects, and, from the utilitarian point of view indiscernible and total, *positive* "responsibility" for the actuality of the final outcome of what we do, making the responsibility infinite and impersonal, and us accountable for everything we *can* do, independently of what we decide). However, I think my real source is Kant, his doctrine of universal respect as a necessary condition for the imputability of responsibility to persons – responsibility for what one decides to do and does – and, especially, Kantian ban of the caring for the moral perfection of others: the perfection of others is up to others, we do not have the right to presume that others will necessarily choose what we think is right. The only moral right regarding the others we have is the right to blame them for the wrong they do. But that right would be destroyed if we no longer consider others as being free to decide for themselves, including freedom to choose evil (and attack us, as free

to easily escape her assailant, but found it beneath her to run away, would her "proof of innocence through suicide" make any sense? Obviously, suicide could never be as good as the successful evasion of the attacker. For, if looking for refuge or defending herself was not worth her while--whether out of contempt for the attacker, or because she could not bear the shame of fighting or "contact" with the attacker that defense presupposes - then suicide could hardly serve the purpose of proving her sincerity. Sincerity requires no proof, nor does it require suicide, but neither does it protect from collaboration with the aggressor. And if she refuses to defend herself because she cannot bear the humiliation that exposure to aggression brings about, the kind of humiliation that no one can in advance be protected from in our temporal world of free action, then she must endure another sort of humiliation. It is moral capitulation stemming from her own arrogance, resulting not only in well-deserved defeat but dishonor as well. For the absolute inability to accept defeat and the need for its invalidation and denial at any cost reveals that what is at stake is not some value being placed at risk but something entirely different: a kind of arrogance that does not respect the value of the right to self-defense (and everything that it entails).

Thinking that one is engaged in a proper defense of one's core identity, a person unable to accept defeat must either set things straight or come to terms with circumstances in a very strong sense of the word. Instead, a character like Lucretia does not accept defeat but takes it as a new defining element of her self and declares victory, just as she suffers the annihilation of her identity and complete defeat. This same mechanism applies in every detail to the pacifist's position.

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responsible, i. e. blamable, agents). True respect of others includes the acceptance of this freedom of theirs. The right to blame them for the wrongness of what they do is possible only on the basis of our recognition that it is up to them to decide what they will decide. For Kant, cf. e. g. 6:386, 6:392, etc; cf. also J. Babić, (2004) "Toleration vs. Doctrinal Evil in Our Time", *The Journal of Ethics*, Vol. 8, p. 234, for the possibility to choose evil as a part of the description of (moral) person.

One question remains to be considered: if pacifism were universally accepted, wouldn't this eliminate all negative consequences of any use of force, offensive or defensive? Wouldn't the goal of pacifism be achieved if everyone lived according to pacifist demands? Wouldn't this be a proof that pacifism is an acceptable doctrine?

There is no proof here, however. There are only logical fallacies, at least two of them. The first comes from the fact that what is accepted and what is acceptable are entirely different matters. "Accepted" pertains to what is factual, while "acceptable" is a normative term. Even without calling upon a well established view that "is" cannot imply "ought," it can be convincingly shown that acceptance, even universal acceptance of pacifism says nothing about its acceptability. If we imagine a world of universal abstinence from use of force because of (factual) acceptance of pacifism--which could happen if pacifism became universal religion--this still would not show that pacifism is acceptable. The moment an attack occurs for the first time we will find that the long standing practice of universal acceptance of pacifism is absolutely of no help in finding a principled answer to the question "Should there be self-defense?"¹¹ If the pre-existing practice of peace is taken as a reason to abstain from self-defense, this could be only a tactical reason, the hope being that everything will remain the same and this attack just an aberration (which will not encourage new attacks). Clearly, then, the conclusion that universal acceptance implies acceptability of pacifism is a logical fallacy.

But this fallacy is a consequence of a prior fallacy--a mistaken presupposition. For if there were no aggression there could be no pacifism either; that is, there would be no opportunity to abstain from self-defense in face of an attack. This presupposition is not a factual but a conceptual matter: the universal lack of use of force would not confirm pacifism, but would only make circumstances suitable for testing it impossible. This, paradoxically, would be a sign of a world with no room for making cardinal decisions, a world that apparently would lack two main components of the human world: temporality and freedom.

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¹¹ A similar argumentation regarding defense of one's country, might be found in Charlie Broad, "Ought We To Fight For Our Country in the Next War" (1936).

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